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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Liability of Classification Societies in English and
                                                American Law
Degree:                     MSc
This dissertation is an analysis of liability of classification societies to shipowner and
third party in English and American law.
In terms of some leading cases in common law, liability of classification societies is
really a contentious issue. On one hand, it is misguided that classification societies
should not assume the liability even if they fail to take reasonable care to perform their
duties. On the other hand, however, societies have been increasingly treated as
additional ‘deep pocket’ defendants. Furthermore, in this circumstance, strict liability or
unlimited liability is often imposed upon classification societies.
First of all, the paper will identify societies’ roles and significance in maritime
community. Secondly, based on high-profile cases such as The Sundancer, Nicholas H
and Ramsgate Walkway, etc., and concepts and principles of contractual and tortuous
liability under legal regime of common law, it will be discussed and examined that what
and how liabilities of classification societies are. Next, defense of societies to their
current and potential liabilities will be investigated and assessed. Finally, conclusion and
recommendation will be made to balance interests of all in whole maritime group and
then as to achieve a controllable, predictable and harmonious situation.
.
KEYWORDS: Liability, Classification societies, Strict liability, Unlimited liability,
                          Contractual and tortuous liability, Defense.
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1Chapter One
Introduction
Classification societies play a vital role within the maritime community. They set the
standards for the design, construction and maintenance of vessels. Classification
societies serve as the unofficial policeman of the maritime world, using independent
verification processes to ensure that seaworthy vessels are in service. We can say that
there are no other bodies with the depth of knowledge, experience and expertise of the
major classification societies. So it is no wonder that as the world demands higher
standards of safety of ship and environmental protection, the burden of meeting this
pressure naturally falls primarily on classification societies.  Over the years the maritime
industry has increasingly depended heavily on classification societies.
Even though classification societies are usually as impartial investigators and
messengers, they often find themselves in the middle of disputes between or among
shipowners, charterers, cargo owners, underwriters , and other claimants. In common
law, shipowner has an implied warranty to exercise due diligence to make ship
seaworthy. When the loss or damage results from shipowner’s failure to make ship
seaworthy, he will be liable for  injured party. However, in most cases, the injured party
cannot recover his full compensation from a negligent shipowner due to two factors.
One is that the shipowner is allowed to limit its liability under national law or
international convention regardless of Hague Rule, Hague-Visby Rule or Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims Convention. Another factor is that ship is often the
shipowner’s sole asset and may be lost or have a value less than the injured party’s
damage. Consequently, claimants must look to other remedies for recovery.
2A logical candidate is the classification society, which was intricately involved in the
process of trying to ensure that the vessel was seaworthy. As a result, these maritime
professionals are often blamed for “starting the whole thing” when a casualty occurs or a
dispute erupts and are increasingly seen as litigation targets for those who feel they have
received a bad shake in the larger game of maritime commerce or recreation. Actually,
Societies have seen an increase in the frequency of claims against them as additional
deep-pocket defendants, particularly by third party claimants.
Whether classification society should be held liable to a shipowner and/or third parties
and what and how their liabilities should be are always a contentious and unresolved
issues. The objectives of this dissertation are, based on common law system,  to
(1) discuss the role and significance of clssificaiton societies;
(2) explore currect and potential theories under which classification societies may be
held liable to shipower and third party;
(3) examine defences to those liabilities.
3Chapter Two
Role and Significance of Classification Society
The role which classification societies fulfil is unique and encompasses every
conceivable aspect of marine safety. There is no other system that provides all sectors of
the maritime industry-shipowners, charterers, financiers, underwriters, cargo owners and
flag and port state administrations with a high professional technical service.
The concept of seaworthiness is relevant to many transactions in maritime commerce,
such as in the carriage of goods and passenger, the chartering of vessels, the sale and
purchase of ships, and vessel employment contracts. When contracts between the
shipowner and a member of any of the above-mentioned groups often refer to the
vessel’s class, class certificates and classification society assessment are important as
evidence of seaworthiness. Ultimately,  it is the commercial imperative that a vessel stay
in class, and the pressures on owners to ensure that class is maintained.
The societies’ surveyors attend during the building of new ships, set the standards for the
materials used, and provide pre and post-delivery guidelines, in order to assess whether
the vessel may be classed in accordance with the regulations of the societies. Societies’
surveyors, in given enough time and money, could exhaustively review the vessel’s
plans, its design features, shipyard record during construction. The surveyors must be
familiar with the vessel’s design, construction, maintenance history, repair history, and
damage history in order to truly appreciate the vessel’s strengths and weaknesses. While
a vessel is being traded, the society will carry out periodic surveys, and any failure to
comply with recommendations made by the society will result in class being withdrawn
or retention of class, with the result that the vessel will no longer be covered by
insurance, and will be unable to trade.
4This is a reason why the classification societies are indispensable in maritime industry.
In practice, shipowner does not have the time for such a study. Time is money.  In
addition, shipowner could not afford the cost of  such a thorough survey for each and
every vessel seeking insurance coverage. However, a classification society, by virtue of
its always being involved in the design, construction, maintenance, and repair of the
vessel, has vital information at its fingertips. By monitoring all phases of a vessel’s
service life, the classification society has a finger on the vessel’s pulse. Given that
scrupulous rules and standards of classification societies, vessel in class is seemed to be
seaworthy.
It may be worth reminding ourselves that classification societies was originally formed
at the request of  hull underwriters in order to obtain independent evaluations of a
vessel’s seaworthiness and to ascertain whether to extend coverage to such vessel.
Societies provides a critical function with respect to the insurability and the
marketability of a vessel. It is the fact that the vessel is granted class, and maintains class
which the hull underwriters will look to in order to satisfy themselves she is seaworthy,
and therefore take an insurable risk.
Similarly, cargo owners, before entering into a contract of carriage, require that the
vessel is seaworthy to carry cargo safety and efficiently. At the same time, cargo
underwriters rely on the assurance of seaworthiness that societies affords although they
do not require seaworthiness or classification warranties as compared to hull and P &I
club. However, cargo underwriters have the right to remove coverage upon reasonable
notice that class of particular vessel carrying insured cargo has been revoked. The fact
that a cargo owner has no practical method for verifying the seaworthiness of the
carrying vessel also provides the foundation of another important function of
classification societies. Each classification society publishes  a periodic updated register
containing the names of the vessels that are enrolled in the society are  in class.
5Consequently, Cargo owners and underwriters will depend upon classification societies
to serve as independent appraisers of a vessel’s seaworthiness.
Classification societies are  also important for  chartering business. When a particular
vessel become suddenly not available in relatively volatile chartering market, the
charterer is required to act quickly and decide whether to arrange for the another vessels
for trading.  However, the charterer usually does not appoint a surveyor to inspect the
vessel to ascertain its seaworthiness. Because it is impractical. Meanwhile, the
shipowner is not willing to deviate his vessel hundreds or thousands of miles to loading
port to let charterer’s surveyor board the vessel to inspect it. Probably, the shipowner
would get nothing after wasting  substantial amount of sailing time  to the loading port
with subsequent loss of revenue each day. The most practical solution turns to the
classification societies.  When the shipowner informs the charterer that vessel is in class,
the charterer can rely upon the classification society’s assurance the  vessel is seaworthy
and fit for the  service.
As well as these traditional private classification societies’ functions, the societies has
increasingly performed their public role in the past thirty years. Governments require
vessels to be seaworthy in order to protect human life and marine environment against
the perils of the sea. However, almost certainly, governments do not perform these
responsibilities by themselves. Consequently, Societies are effectively charged with
performing a public service in ensuring safety at sea, and are engaged by governments to
conduct statutory surveys, and to issue certificates on behalf of those governments in
accordance with international regulations and conventions, such as Safety of Life at Sea
74 (SOLAS), Pollution Prevention Convention (MARPOL 73/78), International
Convention on Standards of training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW 95) and
1966 International Convention on Load Lines. The members of  the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS), which between them class over 90% of
6the world’s cargo-carrying vessels on a tonnage basis, have been delegated authority to
undertake statutory surveys by well over 100 flag states. In addition, IACS members are
fast assuming delegated authority to undertake audits for compliance with the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code under a new SOLAS Chapter IX.
As a result, all members of the maritime industry rely on classification societies based
on the confidence and trust in roles and characteristics of classification societies.
Therefore, whole maritime community has evolved to the point that societies are now an
integral part of the maritime commerce to such an extent that reliance on classification
societies as a strong label of seaworthiness is unavoidable in every business.
But classification societies, like any other bodies or system, are not perfect. The
classification societies’ technical staff could fail to detect divergence from the rules
when reviewing the vessel’s drawings; The surveyors could fail to detect that the
shipyard has used improper  materials during the construction; The surveyors could not
exercise due care to detect defects while inspecting vessels or to notify promptly to the
owner some detects and divergence; The society’s branch office could permit a vessel
owner to defer the periodical special survey of a critical item of machinery when in fact
that piece is unfit to run.  Any failure by any classification society’s representative
would result in the loss or death of life and loss of or damage to the vessel, carried
cargo. Whatever and however loss or damage occurs, the question arises as to whether
the classification societies should be liable to the injured parties and what kind of
liability they should assume.
7Chapter Three
General Theories of Liability
3.1. Common Law Definition
“Classification societies” have been defined as “non profit-making bodies directed by
committees of persons representing shipowners, shipbuilders, engine-builders and
underwriters for the purpose of ensuring ships are properly constructed and maintained
in a seaworthy and safe condition. They make rules governing ship construction, arrange
and carry out surveys during the building of a ship and throughout the vessel’s trading
life. They also conduct research into forms of construction, efficiency and safety of sea-
going vessels, offshore equipment such as oil-rigs and shore plant ” (Sullivan 1998)
Legally, classification societies are marine professionals, with duties arising from, and
commensurate with, their perceived competence. Broadly speaking, by whatever legal
theory employed, failure to discharge these duties is malpractice. Professional persons in
general and those who undertake any work calling for special skill are required not only
to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of
special knowledge and ability.
Regardless of whether the surveyor’s duties derive from custom, classification society
rules, common law, statute, contract, their work fall into two major duties:
(1) to inspect and classify the relevant vessel in accordance with the society’s rules and
standards
(2) to detect  the defects, notify  to  and recommend or warn of interested parties for
taking appropriate action..
8This chapter will explore the leading liability cases in an attempt to unravel the core
meaning of surveyor’s professional standard of duty of care to perform his
responsibility.
3.2. The Test of Reasonable Skill and Duty of Care
While a surveyor’s duties are arguably flexible and dependent upon the circumstances, a
general duty to use due care in making his recommendations, detecting all perceptible
defects of the vessel encountered during inspection, and notifying (at least) the owner
thereof is clear.
In Great American Ins. Co. v. Bureau Verita, 338 F.Supp.at 1011-12, 1973 AMC 1472
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court uttered some legal pronouncements that have influenced
subsequent decisions.  The court identified two duties owed by a survey and
classification society to its clients, one of which is the use of due care to detect defects in
ships which the society surveys and the other of which is to notify the owner or charterer
of such defects. For breach of latter duty, tort liability may be imposed.
In Dilllingham Tug & Barge Corp v. Collier Carbon & Chemical Corp., 548 F.Supp.691
(N.D.Cal, 1981), 707 F.2d 1086, 1984 AMC 1990 (9th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff purchased
a river barge and had it modified for a one-time ocean tow from Galveston, Texas, to
Portland, Oregon, via the Panama Canal. Following the loss of the barge off the west
coast of  Mexico, the barge owner sued the marine architect who had designed the
modifications and the surveyor who had approved the barge for the voyage. The Court
apportioned fault as follows: sixty percent to the tug, twenty percent to the marine
architect, and twenty  percent to the surveyors. The surveyors’ negligence  involved his
failure to detect errors in the marine architect’s stress and stability calculations. The
9court further found that having undertaken the duty, the surveyor could not delegate the
responsibility to an independent contractor.
In addition, In Bosnor, S.A. de C.V v. Tug L.A. Barrios,796 F.2d 776, 1987 AMC 2956
(5th Cir. 1986) the court held that the duty to inspect and notify requires the information
reported to be correct.
Again, in Krohner v. Yacht Systems Hawaii, Inc. 644 P.2d 738 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983),
the court found the duty to inspect and notify was breached despite the surveyor’s
attempt to transform the nature and purpose of his survey. The plaintiff purchased the
boat after the surveyor issued a report which provided that the vessel appeared to be in
good condition and was considered to be a “satisfactory insurance risk”. The report did
qualify its findings by explaining no removals were made during the inspection and that
the bottom was not inspected because the vessel lay afloat. Despite the shortcomings, the
surveyor felt there was “no reason to suspect the condition” of these uninspected areas.
But, five weeks after purchasing, the buyer began to notice running rust and other
discoloration on the inside surface of hull. The buyer had it hauled out of the water to
the drydock. The drydock report stated:
“Most areas [of the bottom] product were soft enough to allow a knife to be
poked in ½ to ¾ of an inch. Some areas allowed the knife to go completely through.
…The majority of the planking on the bottom of the boat was removed. The
exposed frames were mostly rotten….Some frames were so soft, they could be broken
out by hand.”  (see id. at 741)
After the Court of Appeals of Hawaii fully affirmed the trial court’s holding that the
findings of fact with respect of the breach of duty were reasonable and not against the
weight of the evidence, the court stated:
10
“ The surveyor attempts to negate this duty to detect and warn by distinguishing
an insurance and financing survey from a condition survey, and contending that a less
extensive inspection is required for the former. According to the surveyor’s own
testimony, however, the only difference between the two kinds of surveys is that the
condition survey includes a listing of merely cosmetic defects. Thus, we conclude that in
both an insurance and financing survey and a condition survey, a marine surveyor has
the duty to use due care to detect and give notice of perceptible structural defects.
The duty to use “due care” means that a marine surveyor will be held to a
standard of “good marine surveying practice,” i.e., what is “customary and usual in the
practice.” In this case, the trial court concluded that the surveyor owed to the plaintiff
buyer “a duty to use such ordinary care and caution in the exercise of his profession as
would be expected of a similarly situated individual in the City and County of Honolulu,
State of Hawaii…”  (see id. at 742)
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Chapter Four
Liability of Classification Societies to Shipowner
4.1. Liability in Contract
In Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping(The Sundancer) [1994] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 182 , the plaintiffs (Sundance Cruises Corp ) converted a passenger car
ferry into a cruise liner. They engaged the defendant classification society (ABS) to
provide survey certificates both for their own insurance purposes and in order to satisfy
statutory requirement for registration of the vessel in the Bahamas. ABS was nominated
under the relevant Bahamian legislation to provide the certificates required for
registration. The society issued a series of one-voyage provisional certificates followed
by five-month provisional SOLAS and Load Line certificates in June 1984, two days
before the first public cruise. A week later, the ABS issued an interim class certificate
back-dated to the same date as the safety certificates. Thirteen days after the first public
cruise. The M.V. Sundancer, on her third voyage, ran aground off the coast of British
Columbia, tearing a hole in the hull. She was eventually moored at a paper mill’s dock
where the 500 passenger were evacuated. During the evacuation process the listing
became so severe that some passengers suffered personal injuries.
In the Sundancer, the claim based on breach of contract was rejected. Subject to
comments (f) to section 351 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the limitation of
foreseeability falls in recoverable damages. In addition, Section 351 points out the
interests of justice do not always require that a party breaching a contract must pay
damages for all of the foreseeable losses that have been incurred, stating that “there are
unusual instances in which it appears from the circumstances either that the parties
assumed that one of them would not bear the risk of a particular loss or that, although
12
there was no such assumption, it would be unjust to put the risk on that party. ”   The
Section 351 then notes that one such circumstance occurs when there is an extreme
disparity between the loss and the price charged by the breaching party.
So one of the main reasons given by the U.S. Court of Appeals in The Sundancer for the
decision that ABS was not liable for its failure to detect defects in the vessels was the
dispartiy between the fees charged by ABS($85,000) and the damages claimed by
SC($264 million) showed that the society could not have intended to assume the risk of
loss of the vessel. But this is a very weak argument indeed. Of course, the reasonable
expectations of a contracting party are related to the price paid and conduct which would
be a breach of an cheap contract might not be a breach of a expensive one. But all these
are beside the point in the present context because it was assumed by the court in The
Sundancer that ABS had breached its contract with SC. In a world where liability
insurance is pervasive there is no justification for a general proposition that a
professional fee which is only small fraction of the amount at stake in the transaction
shows that the professional cannot have intended to assume the risk of liability
commensurate with the amount at stake. In any particular case there might be evidence
that the fee charged did include the premium for appropriate liability insurance. Such
evidence might relate to the dealings between the disputing parties, or it might relate to
customary behavior in the relevant commercial community. Therefore, disparity
between the fee charged and the amount at stake appears to be very equivocal.
Yet, even if there were evidences to support the conclusion that the defendant did not
intend to assume the risk that the plaintiff might lose its investment as a result of
negligence on the defendant’s part, it would not follow that the defendant should not be
liable in contract for the plaintiff’s loss. It would follow only if the view were taken that
the function of contract law is to give effect to the intention of the defendant or to
commercial practice. It is clear that contract law is not designed to give effect to the
13
intentions of one of contracting parties but to the mutually agreed intentions of them
both. When they are in dispute about their intentions, the law must settle the dispute by
some criterion other than one which gives automatic priority to the intentions of one of
them. As for commercial practice, this would be determinative only if the view were
taken that contract law is designed to give effect to settled expectation however unfair or
unjust they may be.
However, in International Ore & fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Services, Inc. 38 F.3d
at 1283-84, 1995 AMC at 950, the appeals court disagreed district court’s holding that a
large disparity  between the contract price and the damages sought for breach of the
contract will disallow recovery of consequential damages. The appeals court therefore
affirmed the award of damage  under a contractual theory. The court states that the
buyers’ justifiable reliance on the certificates of proper weight “was not an indirect or
collateral consequence of the action of the surveyors. It was a consequence which, to the
surveyors’ knowledge, was the end and aim of the transaction.” (see id at 1284-128,
1995 AMC at 950-52) Similarly, the classification society’s surveyor’s performance of
an accurate inspection rather than a cursory one was “the end and aim of the
transaction.” (see id. )
The fact that the surveyor charged a seemingly low fee relative to potential liability
hardly suggests that the parties failed to contemplate the surveyor’s bearing the risk of a
negligent inspection. The surveyor performs similar professional services on a
frequently recurring basis and can insure against liability for inaccurate inspections
which result in major damage. Then, the surveyor can set its prices accordingly.
Classification societies and  shipowners are sophisticated repeat players in a competitive
market for inspection services. It is fully aware that a negligent inspection may cause the
loss.
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4.2. Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance
In Somarelf  v. American Bureau of Shipping, 704 F.Supp.59, 1989 AMC 1061 (D.N.J.
1989), the owner lodged his claim upon contractual indemnity and tort-based indemnity.
The contractual indemnity claim was based upon the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance in Ryan Stevedoring.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held  in Somarelf  that the
owner did not have a contractual right of indemnity noting that Ryan Stevedoring and its
progeny were based on an implied warranty of workmanlike service that arises only in
the presence of a special relationship between the shipowner and the contracting party of
such a nature that the indemnitor has taken control of the ship in connection with matters
involving the safety and the prevention of maritime accidents. In so holding the court
found that the classification society’s services in preparing a tonnage certificate did not
concern the safety or prevention of accidents or otherwise compromise the safety of the
vessels. According, the court found the absence of the special relationship upon which
Ryan Stevedoring is predicted. In resolving the issue on this basis, the court implicitly
recognized or at least suggested that, under appropriate circumstances, a shipowner
could have a Ryan Stevedoring indemnity claim.
In Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic  S.S. Corp. 350 U.S. at 124 134, 1956 AMC at
9-17 (1956), the problem was the liability of a stevedoring company. A longshoreman
had been injured in connection with the loading of cargo. He claimed and received
damages from  the shipowner. The injury was found to be caused by an unsafe  loading
method. The shipowners requested indemnity from the stevedore. The United States
Supreme Court found that the stevedore had given the shipowners an implied warranty
of workmanlike performance and that the injury was the direct result of a breach of that
warranty.
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The best explanation of the theory of warranty of workmanlike performance is probably
provided by Schoenbaum:
“At common law the warranty of workmanlike performance (WWLP) is a mere
label that was coined no doubt by an inventive judge or litigant to mean that the obligor
in a service  contract has a duty to perform his or her task with reasonable care, skill and
diligence. Thus the WWLP is a legal “construct” that was originally rooted in the
concept of negligence.” (1994, p190)
Schoenbaum also discusses at length the two distinct elements of  Ryan WWLP: (1) “a
contract warranty applicable between parties with contractual privity or on a third party
beneficiary theory”  (1994, p191) and (2) “an implied indemnity theory.” (1994, p192)
But, how far the WWLP extends today is a difficult question.  In Navieros Oceanilos,
S.A. v. S.T. Mobil Trader, 554 F.2d 43,46, 1977 AMC 739,744 (2d Cir. 1977), the
majority view is that indemnity should be granted if the “critical elements” of Ryan are
present. The shipowner is liable without fault and the harm is caused by one with whom
he has a contractual relationship. Moreover, the courts looked very carefully at the
contract to see if there was the requisite contractual relationship if the contractor in fact
had the operational control necessary for implied indemnity. Indemnity will also be
denied if concurrent negligence on the part of the shipowner prevents the stevedore or
other marine contractor form doing his lawful job. If indemnity is denied for any of
these reasons, the court will allow contribution, and the damages will be apportioned on
the basis of comparative fault.
In  Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping(The Sundancer) [1994] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 183 , the owner sued the classification society, alleging that “defects
compromising the vessel’s watertight integrity” caused the sinking. The owner claimed
that, if  ABS had not been negligent, certain defects in the vessel which caused her to
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sink would have been detected by ABS and the vessel would not have been classed and
so would not have set sail until they had been corrected. The owner argued that the Ryan
doctrine applied to classification societies. Under the Ryan doctrine, the classification
society could be liable for damages in contract, based on the implied warranty of
workmanlike performance.
The Sundancer court interpreted Ryan to state that the classification society did not
undertake structural work, nor did the society have any control over the conversation
work of the vessel. Because the society merely inspected and certified the vessel, it did
not create the defects in the vessel’s seaworthiness. The court noted that “the services
and activities of a classification society differ markedly from those provided by a
stevedore.” Thus, the court held that the Ryan doctrine did not apply.
4.3. Liability in Tort
In the Sundancer, [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 183, the owners also sought damages in tort,
including claims of negligence, gross negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.  The
owners alleged that defects in the vessel that were undiscovered by the classification
society proximately caused the sinking. The court found that one of the two defects had
existed over a period of twelve years and the other over a period of four years, and not
one surveyor had noticed them. Nonetheless, the court found no gross negligence. The
plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim was rejected because it was not established
that the owners would have requested the society to supply information for their
guidance. According to the court, surveys were requested only to fulfill the
administrative requirements for putting the vessel into service.
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In Somarelf v. American Bureau of Shipping, 720 F.Supp. 441, 1989 AMC 2330 (D.N.J.
1989), the time charters of two vessels sued the American Bureau of Shipping(ABS) for
inaccuracies in its certification of certain net tonnage specification. These inaccuracies
caused the time charterers to incur extra Suez Canal charges that they could not recover
form their sub-charters. The time charterer settled with the vessel owners for $ 222,000,
and the vessel owners sought indemnification from ABS.
The court recognized that the shipowner may be entitled to indemnification from the
classification society based upon tort. Vessel owners claimed against ABS under a tort-
based theory of indemnity for negligent misstatement, which the court addressed as
follows:
“The base purpose of tort-based indemnification is to shift the burden of
compensating the victim of a tort to the party who is principally, if not solely,
responsible for the tort’s occurrence. As the Court previously stated indemnification has
usually been available only where the party seeking it was merely passively negligent
while the would-be indemnitor was actively at fault. ’Passive negligence’ has been
limited to instances in which the indemnitee was vicariously or technically liable. Where
the party seeking indemnification was itself guilty of acts or omissions proximately
causing the plaintiff’s injury, tort indemnification is inappropriate.” (see id. at 451, 1989
AMC at 2345-46)
The court found that vessel owners were merely “ technically liable” to the time
charterers because of the warranties in the charter party. Thus, the owners could make a
tort-based indemnification claim against ABS, because it was ABS that was “actively at
fault” by virtue of its miscalculation of Suez Canal tonnage, which directly led to the
loss. (see id. at 452, 1989 AMC at 2346)
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Finding that a claim for negligent misrepresentation exists under general maritime law
based on section 552 of Restatement (Second) of Tort, the court decided that the vessel
owner would be entitled to tort indemnity in the event that it could show negligent
misrepresentation on the part of the classification societies. Under section 552 of
Restatement (Second) of Tort, negligent misstatement is are recognized as follows:
(1) one who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
Then, the court delineated three prerequisites that the shipowner must establish in order
to recover for negligent misrepresentation under section 552 of Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
(1) ABS in the course of its profession, supplied false information for the time
charterer’s  guidance in a business transaction;
(2) ABS failed to exercise reasonable care in gathering the information;
(3) the time charter relied on the false information in a transaction that ABS knew the
information.
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The court felt that ABS had failed to use reasonable care in its calculations, and
therefore clearly supplied an incorrect Suez Canal tonnage certificate, one that was
needed by both the owners and charterers for guidance in business transactions. As to
the third and fourth criteria, the court said:
“The time charterer plainly relied on the Suez Canal figures when entering into
voyage charters…. Beyond the issue of the time charterer’s actual reliance, it is also
clear that the time charterer had a right to rely on ABS’s figures by virtue of the
warranties contained in the time  charter. Although the time charter were negotiated
before computation of the Suez Canal figures, the warranties…effectively incorporated
the Suez Canal figures into the time charter agreements between the time charterer and
the vessel owners.” (see id. at 453, 1989 AMC at 2348)
As far as ABS’s knowledge is concerned, in the judge’s view, plaintiff was required to
prove that ABS, through its relevant employees, had knowledge and understanding of
the importance of its national tonnage certificates and Suez Canal special tonnage to the
maritime industry an and specifically, that ABS, when issuing Suez Canal tonnage
certificates with no disclaimer and not specifically addressed to any single party,
understood that parties such as time charter and voyage charter, as well as owners,
would properly and foreseeably rely on the Suez Canal special tonnage certificates
issued by ABS. Plaintiff succeeded in meeting its burden of proof on this issue.
Finally, in regard to proof of pecuniary loss, the court held that the evidence clearly
supports the proposition that the time charterer suffered financial loss as result of  ABS’s
negligence. The Suez Canal differential is based in large part on the special tonnage
certificate and there is no question that the time charterer could have charged a higher
differential to its voyage charterers had the correct net tonnage been known. Since the
court found all four criteria were met, ABS’s conduct was found to constitute negligent
misstatement.
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4.4. Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract
It has been questioned whether or not concurrent liability should exist both in contract
and in the tort of negligence. Furthermore, it is clear that in those circumstances where
claims in contract and in the tort of negligence exist concurrently, the nature and extent
of the duty of care in the tort of negligence is affected by the terms of the contract. It is
submitted that it is not always easy to reconcile the numerous decisions relating to this
area of law.
There is no bright line rule for defining the difference between a surveyor’s contract and
tort although the distinction is certainly one of substance. For example, contract can oust
any tort duties under right circumstances. Contractual duties can also be significantly
reduced by agreement. On the other hand, only tort law squarely provides for
contribution. Chartles M. Davies commented:
“ Because negligent performance of services is normally a breach of warranty of
workmanlike service, the distinctions between causes of action based on trot theories
and contract theories have often been blurred by counsel and courts, though the theories
are discrete. Because third parties may enjoy the benefits of joint and several liability of
joint tortfeasors and the rights of the parties to contribution or indemnity may turn on the
theory of law on which recovery is based the distinctions between tort and contract
theories should be preserved” (1994)
The relationship between tort and contract in the context of surveyor liability was
explored in Sundancer Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping.[1994] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 183. The Plaintiff’s  claims based on tort were also barred by virtue of the East
River 476 U.S. 858, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986) doctrine, which states that when claims are
based on contract, no tort claims under certain more specified preconditions are possible
Incidentally, East River doctrine does not bar tort claims based on personal injuries.
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Yet, it appears that courts have not come to a consensus in this area. For instance,  in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex.1947), the court
held that where a party’s breach of contract results in damage beyond the loss of the
benefit of the bargain, the injured party may have causes of action in tort and contract.
The court found not only that an insufficient repair (which led to even greater damage)
not only violated a duty to repair found in the contract, but also that the failure to use
reasonable skill and diligence breached a common law duty, providing a basis for
plaintiff’s tort action.
In author’s opinion, with reference to Lord Sarman’s judgement in Tai Hing Cotton Mill
Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] 1 AC 80, any tortious duty of care, if it exists,
will have been defined by the scope of those contractual rights and liabilities which the
relevant parties have agreed. Thus the contract between the parties is seen as being the
issue which is of primary importance whereas the duty of care in tort of negligence is at
best relegated to a position of secondary importance.
If it is accepted that claims for breach of contractual duties and duties of care in the tort
of negligence are capable of existing concurrently, one may well question the
significance of existence of any tortious claim if it is governed by the primary
contractual relationship between the parties and thus cannot confer any greater
benefit/liability  than that which the parties have contractually agreed. The importance of
the existence of a concurrent duty of care is clear in the following two instance:
(1) The most obvious of these must be where the contractual cause of action has
become time barred. In most instances, the limitation periods for causes of
action in the tort of negligence will expire later than those limitation periods
for the contractual causes of action even though they may arise from the
same facts. This situation really could raise complex issues for any court to
consider. But from the public policy point of  view, the continuation of
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causes of action in the tort of negligence following the expiration of
contractual causes of action should be enhanced. Because major function of
classification societies involve safety of life and prevention of pollution of
environment.
(2) The existence of a concurrent duty of care is of importance when deciding
issues of contributory negligence. It has already been seen that the
contractual  relationship is responsible for limiting the scope of a duty of
care. Conversely, by reference to contributory negligence, the existence of a
duty of care can limit or reduce the potential contractual liabilities of the
parties.  The issue about contributory negligence will be discussed at length
in Contributory Negligence of Chapter Six.
Actually, the existence of a concurrent duty of care will be more complex when deciding
issues of contributory negligence. In Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher &
Others [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19, the Court of Appeal considered the power to apportion
blame under the Law Reform (Contributory of Negligence) Act 1945. The court
identified three categories of cases when the question could be asked in each of the
categories as to whether or not the Law Reform (Contributory of Negligence) Act 1945
applied:
(a) where the defendant’s liability arose from some contractual provisions which
did not depend upon negligence on the part of the defendant;
(b) where the defendant’s liability arose from a contractual obligation which is
expressed in terms of taking care (or its equivalent) but does not correspond
to a common law duty to take care which would exist in the given case
independently of contract;
(c) where the defendant’s liability in contract is the same as his liability in the
tort of negligence independence of the existence of any contract.
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The court held that facts giving rise to claims falling only within the third category could
give rise to a finding of contributory negligence under the 1945 Act. The principal
judgement of the Court of Appeal was delivered  by O’Connor LJ. He considered that he
had to consider in detail the wording of the 1945 Act. Section 1 of Law Reform
(Contributory of Negligence) Act 1945 provides:
“1. Where any person suffers damage as a result partly of his own fault and
partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall
not be defeated by the reason of the default of the person suffering the damage, but the
damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court
thinks fit and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the
damage…”
In his judgement, O’Conner LJ indicated that he was of the view that concurrent liability
in contract as well as in tort existed, he stated as follows:
“…this is but a recognition of what I regard as a clearly established principle that
where under the general law a person owes a duty to another to exercise reasonable care
and skill in some activity, a breach of  that duty gives rise to claims in tort
notwithstanding the fact that the activity is the subject matter of a contract between
them. In such a case the breach of duty will be a breach of contract….”  ( see id. [1988]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 29 )
The crucial portion of this statement which needs to be analyzed is his Lordship’s
reference to “general law”. He proceeds to argue that there is power to apportion in
contractual cases but only in the third category, as cited above, where liability in
contract is the same as in tort independent of the existence of any contract. Therefore,
one should assume that he is, by specifying the term “general law”  making reference to
a contractual duty to exercise all reasonable skill and care which arises irrespective of
the existence of any express contractual provision to this effect. However, it is surprising
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that his Lordship did not consider other circumstances further, that is, 1945 Act could
apply to the first and second category as well.
His approach reveals a contrast and distinction from the views of Lord Scarman in Tai
Hing [1986] 1 AC 80. If the view of Lord Scarman were to be applied to these facts, the
finding would surely have been that duties of care in the tort of negligence exist in the
first and second category as well, albeit that the scope of that duty of care is governed
and limited and is secondary to the scope of the contractual duty itself, However, even
upon the basis of the reasoning of O’Connor LJ, the necessity for the existence of the
duty of care in the tort of negligence may be clearly seen.
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Chapter Five
Liability of Classification Societies to Third Parties
From a conceptual view, as far as the American law is concerned, claims of injured third
party against classification societies fit the Restatement’s concept of negligent
misrepresentation like a glove.
On one hand, if physical damage is involved, section 311 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts will address a cause of action for negligent representation. Section 311 (1)
provides:
“One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action take by the other in reasonable reliance on such
information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.”
Thus, we can conclude that section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts creates a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical damage when
the following prerequisite are present:
1. The defendant must negligently provide false information;
2. The recipient of that information must have taken action as the result of
relying on that information;
3. Physical damage must result form that action; and
4. The injured third person must be one whom the defendant knows or should
expect to be imperiled by the negligent misrepresentation.
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On the other hand, section 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Tort  (referred to Liability
in Tort in Chapter Four) create a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation causing
pecuniary loss when the following prerequisites are met:
1. The defendant is engaged in  a business wherein he supplies information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions;
2. The defendant in the course of that business supplies false information;
3. The defendant fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
the information;
4. The plaintiff is one to whom the defendant intended to supply the
information or one to whom the defendant “knows that the recipient intends
to supply it”;
5. The plaintiff justifiably relies upon the information supplied by the
defendant; and
6. The plaintiff suffers a pecuniary loss as a result.
It is worthy noting that section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is applied
where physical damage is involved, and section 552 focuses upon instances when only
pecuniary loss is present. Section 552 sets more rigorous standards than section 311
because class of potential plaintiffs suffering pecuniary loss without concomitant
physical damage can be quite broad so that it could invoke substantial and indeterminate
amount and class if the limitation is not carried out in this respect.
For example, a cargo owner sustains damages as the result of classification society’s
failure to enforce its rules, adequately review the design of a vessel, and/or adequately
inspect a vessel. If he attempts to sue the classification society, all of the elements for a
cause of action in tort are based upon negligent misrepresentation. If the damage is
physical damage, such as rotten fruit due to defects in ventilation. Section 311 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts could be applied if all four of its prerequisites are met:
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1. The defendant-classification society has negligently provided false
information because classification society permitted a vessel to remain in
class when in fact the vessel does not meet the classification society’s rules
and standards and the classification society’s representative knew or should
have been aware of this non-compliance. Consequently, the classification
society had negligently conveyed inaccurate information;
2. The shipowner, as recipient of that information, relies upon the presence of
classification certificates aboard the vessel that the vessel is in class and/ or
cargo owners entrust their cargo to a vessel knowing hat the usages and
practices of the trade are such that only classifies vessels are offered for
service notwithstanding without such a representation;
3. Physical damage results from that action by virtue of the cargo owner having
agreed to ship its cargo on a vessel which in fact is unseaworthy when that
unseaworthy condition, which should have been discovered by the
classification society, causes damage to the cargo; and
4. The classification society knows that cargo owners rely upon the
classification certificate as assurance that the vessel is reasonable fit and that
the cargo owner will be imperiled by entrusting its cargo to the unseaworhy
vessel.
But, if the pecuniary damage is involved such as loss of profit due to delay arising from
repair of substantial deficiency which classification society should have detected, a
cause of action against classification society could be subject to section 552 of
Restatement (Second) Torts if the prerequisites are met:
1. The classification society has engaged in a business wherein it supplied
information relating to the seaworthiness of a vessel for guidance of
shipowners, cargo owners, charterers and underwriters in their business
transaction.
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2. The classification society in the course of that business has supplied false
information by maintaining the vessel in class thus representing that the
vessel is seaworhy when in fact it is not;
3. The classification society has failed to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining the information upon which the issuance of a
classification was based or maintaining the certificate in existence inasmuch
as representatives of the classification society have failed to properly review
plans or drawings and/or have failed to properly survey the vessel;
4. The cargo owner is one to whom the classification society knows that the
shipowner, as the recipient of the classification information, intends to supply
it; and
5. The cargo owner justifiably has relied upon classification status in deciding
to ship its cargo aboard the vessel.
With reference to the above, it appears that the major problem is whether classification
society knows third parties, such as cargo owners, charters and insurers, rely on the
classification certificates as assurance that the vessel is seaworthy and fit for trading.  As
a matter of fact, the activities of a classification society consist of formulating rules
pursuant to which seaworthy vessels may be built, reviewing the design plans and
drawings of new buildings in  order to ensure that the design of the vessels complies
with the rules, inspecting construction to ensure that the vessel is built in accordance
with those approved plans, and surveying he vessel during the course of its service life
in order to ensure that it is being maintained in accordance with the society’s rules and
standards.
The classification societies prepares a register listing each of the vessels enrolled in the
society and then publishes that register so that members of the maritime community may
refer to it when deciding whether to hire or insure a particular vessel. In turn, the
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classification societies are aware that cargo owners, charterers, cargo underwriters, hull
underwriters, and P & I club depend heavily upon a classification society’s certification
when making decisions to become involved with particular vessels.
Indeed, the classification society itself regards its role as that of an independent and
impartial inspector and assessor. Those societies recognize that their job is to set
standards and rules that, if met,, will produce a vessel that is fit for its intended voyage.
The classification societies further recognize that their role is to serve as an independent
policeman to see whether indeed the shipowner is designing, constructing, maintaining,
and repairing its vessel in accordance with those rules and standards.
Classification  societies fully know the shipowner to pass classification status and data to
third parties, such as cargo owners, charterers, hull insurers, etc. and the society
recognizes that one of its primary purposes and functions is to provide assurance from
an independent source to such third parties that a vessel is fit due to classification.
Indeed, the very purpose of classification societies is to facilitate shipowners’ dealing
with third parties and to protect third parties who deal with and/or come in contact with
their ships. In turn, cargo owners, charterers and insurance companies do conduct
business on the basis of the fact that a vessel is classified in accordance with the
classification process. They only deal with vessels that are enrolled in a classification
society and maintained in class.
Classification societies can completely understand the complex interrelationship
between classification status with the whole maritime community. They know that third
parties are relying upon that that information. In summary, under the American
jurisdiction, the court should use the Restatement of Tort  to find a cause of action based
upon negligent misrepresentation, and under the appropriate set of facts, the courts
should impose liability upon the classification society.
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 In English law, the action against classification societies by third parties should be
based on the negligent misstatement. But, in terms of the criterion with regard to a cause
of action in tortious liability, negligent misstatement in English law is similar to
negligent misrepresentation.   So far as surveyors or professional person are concerned, a
duty of care may be owed to anyone who may reasonably be expected to rely on the
advice given . No duty will owed if reliance on the advice cannot reasonably be
foreseen.
The requirements of the tort are that the defendant (or his agent) must communicate
considered advice in a business context to the plaintiff (or his agent) in the knowledge
that the plaintiff will rely on it. It must also be reasonable for him to rely on it. It must
also be reasonable for him to rely on that advice. The defendant is  then under a duty to
give careful advice. If he does not take reasonable care, he will be liable for losses
caused by the plaintiff’s reliance on the advice.
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Chapter Six
Appraisal of Possible Defenses by Classification Societies
6.1. Proximate Cause and Forseeability
In American law, proximate cause is considered as a surveyor’s excellent defense. It
means that even if the court finds that the surveyor has breached his duty to detect and
warn the defects, such a breach must be a proximate cause of the loss.
In Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp. v. Collier Carbon & Chem. Corp case 707 F.2d 1086,
1092, 1984 AMC 2990, 1998 (9th Cir. 1983), the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California had found the surveyor twenty percent at fault for the
sinking of a barge based on the surveyor’s failure to detect errors in a marine architect’s
stress and stability calculations in connection with the modification of a vessel.
But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had
failed to provide evidence establishing that the surveyor’s negligence was a proximate
cause of the barge’s capsizing. Therefore, Court of appeals reversed that portion of the
district court’s finding that imposed liability on the marine architect and the surveyor by
the reasoning as follows:
“…mere negligence alone does not give rise to liability, rather, the negligence
must have caused the injury… Causation, in this case, would necessitate a finding that,
had the omitted calculations been performed, they would have demonstrated that the
[condition of the vessel was] not in fact sufficient for the contemplated voyage. The trial
judge did make such a finding; however, we believe that this finding was clearly
erroneous…
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… The experts who testifies at trial, including the expert called by[the owner],
agreed that had [the tug] conducted the tow as they were advised to, the barge would
have survived the voyage, and therefore the barge was properly designed for the voyage
contemplated by the parties. If the [barge] were properly modified for the purpose of the
contemplated voyage, then any negligence on the part of [the architect] in failing to
make certain calculations was not he cause of the barge’s sinking; the barge was lost due
to [ tug’s ] failure to conduct the tow properly.
…since the trial judge found [the surveyor] liable solely for a failure to discover
[the architect’s] negligence during its review of [the architect’s] calculations, this
finding was also clearly erroneous, and therefore must be reversed. ” (see id. at 1092-
1093, 1984 AMC at 1998-1999)
As reflected in the Dillingham case, the requirement of establishing a proximate case
relationship between surveyors’ alleged negligence and damages can be a strong defense
and a major obstacle for plaintiffs.
In contrast, English law in terms of this issue seems to be complex. In English law,
every negligence case involves a judgement about whether there is a sufficient
relationship of proximity between plaintiff and defendant before a duty of care ought to
be imposed. If  no duty to take care is owed, then no liability for negligence will lie. The
principle criterion of liability is hat of foreseeability. It must be foreseeable to the
defendant that his conduct might cause injury to the plaintiff if he fails to exercise
reasonable care.
In Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co., (Nicholas H) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
481, [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 492 (C.A.), The vessel “Nicholas H” was destined for Italy.
On the voyage, the vessel deviated and anchored off San Juan, Puerto Rico, due to a
crack in her hull. While in San Juan further cracks developed, the vessel’s classification
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society, NKK, was engaged to survey her. First, the surveyor recommended permanent
repairs in San Juan port before the voyage to Europe. However, after temporary repairs
using sealant and welding techniques, the surveyor issued a further report revoking his
first recommendation and allowed the  vessel to proceed to the next discharging port
before completing the remaining repairs. The crack reopened after a week at sea due to
welding of the temporary attachments.  In spite of rescue attempts by the crew, the
“Nicholas H” sank with all of its cargo. The cargo owners claimed shipowners $6
million for the loss of the ore, but the shipowner's liability was contractually limited by
the Hague Rules to $500,000. The claim was settled for that amount. The cargo owner
then brought a claim against the vessel’s classification society, NKK for the balance of
$5.5 million, plus interest.
In Nicholas H, the judge held that on the assumed facts of this case there was a very
close and direct degree of proximity between NKK’s surveyor and the plaintiffs. Having
first recommended that the vessel should not leave port without having undergone
permanent repairs, the surveyor later recommended that she could sail after only
temporary repairs had been done, knowing that she was fully loaded, and therefore
knowing that if it was dangerous for her to go to sea in that condition, the goods were
just as likely  to be damaged or lost as the vessel itself. Then, the court held further that
although it is true that surveyor had no actual direct physical control over the vessel in
the sense that he could bar her sailing, the sanction imposed by his fist report rendered it
high probability that the shipowner could not sail (as in fact occurred).
Accordingly, there seems to be three elements in this finding of proximity: (1) the
control exercised by NKK over the shipowner’s operations; (2) the fact that the cargo
was known to be already on board the vessel by the NKK surveyor; and (3) the
closeness in time and place of the survey and the casualty.
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It is clear that a duty of care should be owed by professional men to third parties where
there was no contractual relationship between them. However, subsequent attempts to
define both the duty and its scope can create more problems than the decisions. In fact,
there was no simple formula or touchstone to provide in every case a ready  answers to
the questions whether, given certain facts, the law would or would not impose liability
for negligence, and how, in cases where such liability could be shown to exist, determine
the extent of that liability. In Nicholas H, the judge held :”….I wish to emphasize that
this conclusions is based simply and solely on those assumed facts, and has no general
application whatsoever to any other situation which might arise between a classification
society and cargo owners or other third party with whom they are not in contractual
relationship.” ( [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 500 )
To be frank, when relationship between classification societies and claimants is
examined, phrases such as “foreseeability”, “proximity”, “neighborhood”, “just and
reasonable”, “fairness”, “voluntary assumption of responsibility ” are not precise
definitions. At best they were only labels or phrases descriptive of their very different
factual situations which had to be carefully examined in each case before it could be
pragmatically determined whether a duty of care existed and, if so, what was the scope
and extent of that duty. In Caparo Industries PLC  v. Dickman and others [1990] 1 ALL
ER 568, Lord Bridge submitted that  “proximity” and “fairness”  are “little more than
convenient labels to attach to the features of different specific situations which…the law
recognizes pragmatically as giving rise to a duty of care”
Furthermore, in most case, negligent misstatement against third party causes economic
loss rather than physical damage. The subject therefore raises the problem of economic
loss and its recoverability in tort.
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In English law in general the fact that economic loss is foreseeable consequence of a
negligent act is insufficient to entitle the plaintiff who suffer that loss to recover
damages. A person is not liable in the tort of negligence for the purely economic loss
which he causes by his negligent deeds. But there is a notable exception in the case of
negligent misstatement. The case which introduced the principle of liability for
economic loss arising out of negligent misstatement is the case of Hedley Byrne and Co
Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd.
The Hedly Bryne case established that people holding themselves out as being skilled
professional could be liable in negligence for the economic loss they cause to those who
rely upon their advice,. In certain circumstances (usually where the adviser is in the
business of giving advice), “special relationship” exists so that the professionals owes a
duty of care to the person relying upon his advice, in giving information or advice. The
precise circumstances in which a special relationship will exist have not been defined,
but the following words of Lord Morris in the Hedly Bryne and Co Ltd v. Heller &
Partners Ltd.  [1964] AC 465 have been often quoted:
“It should now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special skill
undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another
person who relies on such a skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that the service is to
be given by means of or by the instrumentality of words, can make no difference.
Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably
rely upon his judgement or skill or upon his ability to make careful enquiry, a person
takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows this information or
advice to be passed on to another person who, as he knows or should know, will place
reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”
In addition, the House of Lords in the Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman and Others
[1990] 1 All ER 568 considered that, where a duty of care in respect of negligent
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statements did exist, the limit or control mechanism, imposed on the liability of a
wrongdoer towards those who have suffered economic damage as a result of his
negligence, depends on need to prove that the wrongdoer knew that his statement would
be communicated to the plaintiff either as an identifiable class specifically in connection
with that transaction or transactions of particular kind.
In Nicholos H, it is surprising that court held nature of loss of plaintiff ‘s cargo is
physical damage. The argument is that cargo is tangible and so damage to cargo is
physical. Consequently, the boundaries of liability for pure economic loss defined in
Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd. and Caparo Industries PLC v.
Dickmann and others cases were rejected to apply to this case. But, in my opinion, cargo
was clearly of purely economic value to Mar Rich plaintiff, who is a commodity dealer.
I don’t think that the distinction between tangible and intangible assets accurately
expresses how most people feel about the world. I would say that a person’s interest in
his or her physical and mental health and well-being is never purely economic, but that a
person’s interest in tangible property often is. Conversely, I would accept that even a
person’s interest in intangible assets such as shares and bonds may in some cases not be
purely economic. Accordingly, the line between injuries to economic interests in assets
and injuries to non-economic interests in assets could be more reasonable than that
between injuries to tangible assets and injuries to intangible assets when the question as
to  determines whether damage is physical or economic is solved.
6.2. Reliance and Control
In The Sundancer [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 183, the court found that the shipowner did not
rely on the surveys because they were only administrative in character. Additionally, the
37
classification society had no physical control over the ship. In my eyes, these arguments
appear to  be not so compelling.
Briefly, I wholly agree with the judgement about the reliance of cargo owner on the
classification society (NKK) in Nicholas H ( [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 492) although
plaintiff cargo owner lose the claim to NKK based on other augments. The court of
appeals in Nicholas H was of the opinion that only the shipowner had control over the
cargo. But, on the other hand, the fact is that although the surveyor did not have physical
control over the ship, he could have forbidden the ship to sail. A survey has control over
the vessel in the sense that he can deny permission for the vessel to sail. If the vessel
sails anywhere under sanction, the surveyor or his classification society would not be
liable. Control means control over the situation, not physical control the vessel.
In some cases, loss is really suffered by the person only because that person relied on
something said or done by another. But even if loss is inflicted on a person by the
conduct of another despite the fact that the  former did not rely on anything said or done
by the latter, lack of reliance by itself is no bar to recovery.  As a matter of fact, this
position belongs to one of  six categories in negligent misstatement. i.e. Advice given by
a defendant to a third party resulting in loss to a plaintiff who does not rely on the
defendant.  The position is supported by Ross v. Caunters and Ministry of Housing and
Local Governernment v sharp. [1980] Ch 297 at 322-323. In Ross v. Caunters, the
defendant solicitor negligently allowed a will to be witnessed by the spouse of an
intended beneficiary. As a result, the plaintiff beneficiary was unable to take his bequest
under the will. The only person, the plaintiff suffer loss was the plaintiff, but he had no
contract with the solicitor and could not be said to have relied on him. But, the judge
held that the solicitor is liable on basic negligent principles. He could have foreseen
damage to the plaintiff, and there were no policy reasons for excluding a duty of care, as
the only person who could have suffered loss was the plaintiff.
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In Carbotrade S.p.A v. Bureau Veritas 99 F.3d 86, 97, 1997 AMC 98, 108 (2d Cir.
1996), the court favored the classification society based on reliance issue. The plaintiff
didn’t establish reliance upon the defendant’s classification  of  the vessel. The court
reached that conclusion by pointing out that the plaintiff had begun loading the vessel
before the classification societies had completed its intermediate survey, the certificate
had expired before loading began, and the plaintiff’s surveyor knew of the unseaworhty
condition yet the plaintiff chose to do nothing. However, those factors in this case is not
so compelling. The commencement of loading prior to completion of the class survey
and the expiration of the certificate before loading began are not per se strong augments.
Because the cargo owner would be unaware of those circumstances, and even if he
aware, the cargo owner probably would be justified in concluding that classification
society’s surveyor are present, adequate attention to be paid to the vessel’s
seaworthiness. In my personal view, reliance could be established but knowledge on the
part of the cargo owner’s surveyor of the unseaworthy condition can and should be fatal
to recovery from the classification society if that surveyor had no assurance from the
class surveyor that the  problem would be rectified.
In Cargill Inc. v. Bureau Veritas 902 F.Supp.53 1996 AMC 582, the court found an
absence of reliance based upon the following considerations:
(1) the plaintiffs had not consulted the classification register;
(2) the plaintiff hired their own independent surveyor to inspect the ship after the
shipowner had completed repairs;
(3) plaintiffs failed to demand an attestation of class to ascertain the vessel’s
present classification status; and
(4) a number of the vessel’s certificates had expired immediately prior to the
commencement of loading
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It seems to me that reasons articulated above are unreasonable. The cargo owners’
failure to consult the defendant’s register or to obtain an attestation of class is of no legal
basis if interrelationship between classification societies and maritime community is
correctly understood. As explained earlier, cargo owners fully expect classification to
perform their function of ensuring that a vessel is maintained and in class and to remove
the classification certificates from the vessel in the event that class is revoked, which
effectively terminates the vessel’s trading ability. The fact that a well classified vessel
remains in service justifiably entitles a cargo owner to assume that the classification
society has ascertained through its independent verification process that the vessel is
seaworthy. Finally, I would like to reiterate that reliance on the classification societies
by no matter who he is shipowner or third party, form the viewpoint of  whole maritime
community and role and function of societies in maritime commerce, should be
examined and determined.
6.3. Exemption Clause
For a considerable time, nearly all classification societies have inserted exemption
clauses or disclaimer clauses. What form do they take? What is their justification ? what
is the attitude of the court towards them ? These question  will be discussed in this sub-
chapter.
In American law, if exclusion clauses in maritime contracts are not against public policy,
they will be upheld. Certain conditions, however, determine their acceptability to a
judge, that is,
(1) parties should have relatively equal bargaining power;
(2) protection afforded by exclusion clauses should extend only to ordinary
      negligence, not gross negligence;
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(3) they are strictly construed in case of ambiguity.
In Great American Insurance Company v. Bureau Veritas, 338 F.Supp.999, 1972 AMC
145 (S.D.N.Y), 1973 AMC 1755 (2d Cir. 1973), a similar clause was important in
determining the contractual relationship between the classification society and the
shipowners: “ The Bureau Veritas declines any responsibility for errors of judgment,
mistakes or negligence which may be committed by its technical or administrative staff
or by its agent”  ( see id. at 1010, 1972 AMC at 1469) The district court judge stated that
this clause was “ overbroad and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”  ( id.)
In Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia v. S/S Ioannis Martinos, 1986 AMC 769 (E.D.N.C.
1984), the court held that the following three exculpatory clauses, used by different
surveyors involved in the same case, were void as against public policy:
“The foregoing inspection was undertaken and this certificate of readiness is
issued on the following terms and conditions:
While the Officers, Directors and Committees of National Cargo Bureau, Inc.
use their best endeavors to see that the functions of the Bureau are properly executed,
the Bureau makes no warranty of any kind, either express or implied, including warranty
of workmanlike service, respecting its work or services, and is not an insurer of cargo or
other property or of the ship or of the safety of any personnel and disclaims all legal
responsibility for any loss, damage, personal injury or death resulting from any act,
default, omission, negligence, error or breach of any said warranties. Neither the Bureau
nor its Officers, Directors or Committee members nor its surveyors, employees,
representatives or agents are under any circumstances whatsoever to be held responsible
or legally liable for any inaccuracy or error of judgement, default, omission, negligence
or breach of warranty, either express or implied, including warranty of workmanlike
service, arising or allegedly arising out of services of the Bureau, its surveyors or other
employees, representatives or agents. ” (see id. 787-88)
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The second clause read:
“The salvage association considers that the surveyor appointed by it is fully
competent to carry  out this survey but neither The Salvage Association nor the Surveyor
shall in any circumstances be responsible or liable to any person for any act, omission,
default or negligence in connection with the survey or the Certificate(s) or for any loss,
damage or expense howsoever caused which may subsequently occur.” (Id. 788)
And the third exculpatory clause read:
“This Certificate is issued subject to the terms of the Confirmation of Request for
Inspection and Approval of Survey. Neither The Salvage Association nor the Surveyor
shall in any circumstances be responsible or liable to any person for any act, omission,
default or negligence, whatsoever. ”  ( id. )
Even though disclaimer provisions was made in the specific context, the court in Royal
Embassy held surveyor’s duties was running from simple inspection, to notification, to
taking full charge of relevant operations.
In the meanwhile, the court held that disclaimer provisions are generally upheld when
they do not increase the likelihood that negligence will occur. Thus, if a marine surveyor
were to board a vessel after it had been loaded by the stevedores and then examined the
lashings and stowage, he would not be able to affect the quality of work already
performed. Actually, he would merely be viewing the work to determine whether he
should give the appropriate certificate of approval.
Even if the marine surveyor walked on the deck and made occasional suggestions for
securing the cargo, the stevedores would be in a position to disregard the comments and
proceed with their responsibilities. The marine surveyor was not taking control over the
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stevedores. In truth, the stevedores, not the marine surveyors, would be in control and
would normally seek to avoid negligent workmanship.
Yet, the court commented further that the degree of involvement of the marine surveyor
can produce greater duties. If the surveyor is hired to inspect the vessel, and the surveyor
instructs directly the actual manner in which the cargo is lashed, stowed, and secured,
then he may owe a broader duty. In this situation the surveyor has control over whether
the cargo is stowed in a proper manner or whether it is stowed in a negligent manner.
This person would be in control over the workmanship. A disclaimer of liability in this
last situation  would tend to induce negligence. An exculpatory clause which tends to
induce negligence “…is repugnant to traditional law and to sound policy. ” This court,
therefore, concluded that the disclaimers herein are void as against public policy because
facts were alleged which may place the Salvage surveyor and National Cargo surveyor
in the situation where the surveyor took  an active role in the direction of the securing of
the cargo.
In The Sundancer, [1994] 1 Lloyd’Rep.183, the contract between ABS and the
shipowner included several exemption clauses. For instance, the contract included
American Bureau of Shipping Rule 1.25-a release clause-which provided in part:
“…Neither the Bureau nor any of its Committees and employees will, under any
circumstances whatever, be responsible or liable in any respect for any act or omission,
whether negligent or other wise, of its surveyors, agents, employees, officers or
Committees, nor for any inaccuracy or omission in the Record or any other publication
or the Bureau, or in any report, certificate or other document issued by the Bureau, its
Surveyors, agents, employees or Committees.”  ( see id. at 185-186)
An indemnity clause was also present in the contractually relevant documents. The court
suggested that even if the wording in such a release clause were unambiguous, the clause
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might violate public policy. As the clause in question was hidden behind several
references, the plaintiff should have to produce further evidence regarding the actual
intentions of the parties.
In English law this matter is governed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Section 2
(1) provides that “A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given
to persons generally to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or
personal injury resulting form negligence.” Therefore, the disclaimer will be ineffective
if it relates to liability for negligently caused death or bodily injury. Moreover, if the
disclaimer seeks to exclude or restrict liability for other harm suffered as a consequence
of the defendant’s negligence, it must satisfy a test of reasonableness if it is to affect the
defendant’s liability.  (see Unfair Contract Term Act 1977 2 (2) )
In Harris v. Wyre Forest and Smith v. Bush [1989] 2 WLR 790, [1989] 2 All ER 514.
Lord Griffiths made it clear in his judgment that although he regarded the disclaimers
given in the cases before him as unreasonable , he would not consider it unreasonable
for professional men in all circumstances to seek to exclude or limit their liability for
negligence. The judge held that  the burden is on the surveyor to establish that in all the
circumstances it is fair and reasonable that he should be allowed to rely  on his
disclaimer. In considering reasonableness, four matters should always be considered:
(1) were the parties of equal bargaining power ?
(2) would it have been reasonably practicable to obtain the advice given from an
alternative source,  taking into account costs and time?
(3) The difficulty of the task undertaken.
(4) The practical consequences of the decision on the question of
reasonableness--taking into account the sums of money potentially at stake,
the ability of the parties to bear the loss involved and the insurance position.
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However, so far, UK courts have not had to hand down decisions on the validity of
exclusion or disclaimer clauses issued by classification societies. Some decisions have
been reached, however, on onshore disputes, showing that such a clause operates as a
warning and may prevent the plaintiff from establishing breach of the duty to exercise
reasonable care and skill or reliance on the report in relation to inaccurate or uninspected
part.
It should say that if the exculpatory  clause only against  liability of classification society
to shipowner is conspicuous, expressly agreed to beforehand, not ex post facto, and is
not the product of unequal bargaining power (unconscionabiliity), it would appear to
remain a possibility of validity. Simply attaching the provisions to the survey report
such as ”without prejudice” is definitely invalid. On the other hand, if the exculpatory
clause against liability of classification society to third party,  it would appear there is no
possibility. The absence of privity prevents those rules from binding third persons.
6.4. Statutory Immunity
A acceptable or specified exemption of classification society would have little effect on
classification societies action on behalf of governments. Statutory surveys, such as
SOLAS, Load Line, and MARPOL surveys may not be included in the exemption
clause. But, it does not mean that classification societies do not have an opportunity to
exclude their liabilities. In two recent litigated cases in the United States (The Sundancer
and Scandinavian Star), the defendant societies have successfully asserted their
entitlement to immunity form liability under the law of the flag state (Bahamas) in
respect of such statutory survey. However, most states for whom the classification
societies perform statutory surveys and certification do not have legislation which
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confers immunity. Therefore, it appears that the desirable  solutions is to base exemption
from liability on legislation. Actually, but, this  is not an easy issue  to deal with.
In The Sundancer, [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 183, ABS was nominated under the relevant
Bahamian legislation to provide the certificates required for registration.  The Bahamian
Merchant Shipping Act includes a statutory exemption stating that any government
appointee is immunized from liability for issuing statutory certificate in good faith.
Therefore, the court held that the classification society could enjoy immunity from suit
in respect of bona fide provision of these certificates. But, in this case, due to the
certificate provided to plaintiff for insurance purposes, ABS enjoyed no such immunity.
The application of statutory immunity creates some specific legal issues. Historically, an
absolute defense of sovereign immunity was allowed in customary international law to
the foreign state or ruler. However, later a restricted version was applied, whereby
commercial acts were excluded from this defense. Under the restricted version, which is
nowadays generally applied, one has to separate between state acts (acta jure imperrii)
and commercial acts (acta jure gestionis).
Classification societies check and certify whether vessels comply with various state and
international standards concerned with safety, prevention of pollution and so on, as well
as with their own standards for the construction, maintenance and operation of vessel.
They are employed both by governments which implement national law and
international conventions for the purpose of the human life and environment and by
shipowners and others such insurers and cargo owners with an interest in the
maintenance of those standards. They also provide ship surveying and damage
investigation services to insurers, potential purchasers, charterers and so on..
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It is typically said that classification societies perform both public and private functions.
This difference has really been  treated as a standard or argument whether classification
societies assume liability as in The Sundancer case. But this statement is too simple. It is
hard to determine whether any of the functions performed by classification societies is
public.  Public and private functions and characteristics could be overlapped. If a
classification society acts as an independent contractor of government providing
certification  services, it is unlikely that the society would be restricted to be performing
public functions. It is even less possible that a society would be held to performing
public functions if it was employed by a non-governmental entity. On the other hand, if
a society performed functions under statutory authority as a delegate of government,
then it is more likely that its functions would be held to be public, but not everything
which is done by or on behalf of governments, even under statute, is necessarily public
in nature.
Even if a society is performing public function, the function of classification societies
seem , as the matter of public law, to be operational in nature and to contain little policy
elements although this is a tricky statement to make in the abstract without reference to
any particular function and fact situation.
In addition, from the viewpoint of The Sundancer case, a major problem in terms of
immunity is not whether to grant sovereign immunity to a state and its agents on the
basis of international law, but whether to apply foreign, nationally legislative public law,
the application of which would lead to immunity. According to Baade (1991), the
principle of ordre public (acts against public policy) could apply to pierce the protective
veil. Possible ordre public situations would be political asylum and refusal to extradite,
recidivism, penology and moral character, subsidies and countervailing duties, foreign
tax credits, foreign sovereign acts, bribery in government procurement, illegality,
immorality and impossibility.   One might argue, for example, that foreign legislative
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immunity conflicts with the basic values of the legal system in the country of
jurisdiction.
In The Sundancer, it seems Bahamian Merchant Shipping Act provides extensive
legislative protection to these civil servants and governmental appointees with
responsibility to protect life and property at sea without giving a court the option to
determine whether liability exists. Obviously, a purely national immunity system
seriously infringes upon the mandatory aims to protect safety and property at sea under
international conventions. In this case, if by applying the ordre public principle, the
court would take a position against a foreign government on whose behalf the
classification society has exercised public authority under internationally unified rules.
In my personal opinion, the only explanation is that English courts are not willing to
hold that bodies performing regulatory and inspection functions of the type carried out
by classification societies owe duty of care to individuals who suffer loss as a result of
the negligent performance of such functions, even when those functions are operational;
and especially if the functions are performed under some statutory provision. We can
understand decisions and reasoning of courts in the cases in favor of the classification
societies.
As a matter of fact, classification societies play fundamentally important role in the
maritime community. If there was not any special legal regime to protect classification
societies, their role as non-profit making entities designed to  promote the safety of ships
and lives at sea, would be undermined as societies would obliged to curtail some
services in the respect of public interest and exercise their role in a defensive manner.
Consequently, only governments with sovereign immunity could take it on. But, as
governments have not expertise and professional technician in the respect of ship safety
as classification societies possess and they are immune from any potential liability for
the fault or error, things will get worse, even creating catastrophe consequences.
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Undoubtedly, The unique technical expertise of societies is indispensable to both flag
state administrations and shipowners.
Under the latest development, classification societies has been granted an effective law-
making mandate. Subject to a new regulation implemented in July 1998 under SOLAS
1974, the structural and engineering requirements  of recognized classification societies
become binding as a matter of international law.  International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has already formalized the “ delegated authority” role of classification societies.
(referred to the Annex A)
Thus, I don’t want  to deny the classification societies should have some privileges. But
national statutory immunity can leave a lot of room for discretion. Uncertainty and
difficult prediction are unavoidable.   Furthermore, as far as these principles such as
foreign sovereign acts and ordre public belonging  to the scope of public law are
concerned, politicians and diplomats can definitely deal better with this conflict than the
courts. From my point of  view, there should exist a international convention dealing
with the liability of classification societies  with regard to their public role and authority
granted mostly by the whole maritime community at  the level of international accession
or agreement. Enacted law at the international level could be more effective than judge’s
discretion during determining the public functions of classification societies and  dealing
with their immunity.
6.5. Himalaya Clause-Channeling of Liability
In third party claims classification societies have tried to exclude their liabilities to third
parties by a type of Himalaya clause. In light of Himalaya clause servant, agent and
independent contractors of carrier shall not  assume any liability to other person for any
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loss, damage or delay arising or resulting directly or indirectly from any act, neglect or
default on his part while acting in the course of or in connection with his employment.
Despite some tensions with the classical theory of contract, this clause is still accepted
and necessary in most jurisdictions, presumably because the justice and  convenience of
the result is recognized.
In common law, a strict application of the doctrine of privity of contract may leave third
parties in a position in which whey face risks considerably greater than those undertaken
by the contracting parties. While the parties to the contract can calculate the possible
risks of loss and apportion the  loss and insure accordingly, the same cannot be said of
third parties, such as classification societies and stevedores. Consequently, one method
of avoiding the effects of the doctrine of privity of contract is to treat one of the
contracting parties as an agent for his employees, subcontractors or independent
contractors. In New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd. v. AM Satterthwaite Co Ltd., [1975] AC
154, machinery belonging to the consignees was damaged by the defendant stevedores
in the course of unloading a ship. The defendants sought the protection of a limitation
clause contained in the bill of lading which formed the basis of a contract between the
carriers and the consignors. Accordingly, the disputes arose between two litigants,
neither of whom was a party to the contract of carriage. The relevant clause provided
that no servant or agent, including an independent contractor of the carrier was to be
liable for any act or default while acting in the course of his employment. All of the
members of the Privy Council agreed the an appropriately worded clause could protect a
third party and a majority held that his clause did serve to protect the stevedore.
Thus, the question, then, is whether the classification society is entitled to the protection
of this clause. It does not seem possible solely on the basis of the Himalaya clause, but
referred to national law according to which the question on vicarious liability is decided.
In Riverstone Meat v. Lancashire Shipping Co.(Muncaster Castle) [1961] A.C. 807, the
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carrier was liable for the mistakes committed  by  shipyard repairer in connection with a
classification society survey in case of the damage to goods. But exclusivity of liability
of classification society cannot be settled by simply construing the rule in The
Muncaster Castle. It requires a consideration of the whole structure of channeling in law
and practice.
No one can protect a defendant by removing the right to take legal action from the
victim who was not party to the contract. A legislative intervention is needed. This result
is occasionally obtained by the technique of ‘channeling’, which consists of
concentrating the whole of an industrial risk on a single person, presumed to be most
appropriate to bear it. This involves two steps: first, a person is designated as liable for
damage resulting from the incriminated activity; secondly, claims against other persons
are prohibited. Such a system has been set up on an international scale for nuclear
accidents and damage caused by oil pollution. Under the United States Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, the shipowner is solely liable for oil pollution damage. The nuclear damage is
also unlikely to involve the liability of a classification society, since Article 11.2 of the
Brussels Convention 1962 on nuclear merchant ships expressly provides for channeling
of liability, which exclude any other liability except that of the nuclear plant operator.
But, there are still some points at issue about the protection offered by channeling. On
one hand, it appears to be uncertain in dispute since either provisions with narrow scope
provided by only one or two conventions being  only an instrument of international law
might not  be ratified by the state where the legal action might be taken or the state fails
to implement those flexible  provisions on an international basis. On the other hand,
where the shipowner’s non delegable duty to provide a seaworthy ship is in question,
this proviso could not fail to be satisfied.  As the Tetley (1988) said, the viable solution
appears to be “the channeling should be structured so that there are no gaps in the
scheme of liability”
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The basic principle behind channeling of liability is to ensure that the costs of
wrongfully caused losses end up on the party best able to take precautions against
similar losses probably being suffered in the near future.  It seems right that a stronger
deterrence signal should be sent to the owner who control, maintain and manage the
vessel in most circumstances. But it should be worth nothing that classification societies
play a critical role in maritime community and  absolutely became core part of  maritime
commerce. From the viewpoint of the heavy reliance on classification societies by the
whole maritime group-shipowners, cargo owners, insurers, etc., there should be a case
where societies are imposed liability  so as to give them a strong incentive to take care.
Therefore, in order to achieve a satisfactory channeling of liability for deterrence and
precaution purposes, the ideal solution would be certain appropriate apportionment of
responsibility between shipowners and classification societies based on the well
structured system of channeling. On this basis, Himalaya clause will be examined on the
facts of individual cases.
6.6. Non-delegable Duty
The shipowner has a duty to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before
and at the beginning of the voyage. In Riverstone Meat Co. Pty v. Lancashire Shipping
Co.( The Muncaster Castle) [1961] A.C.807, this duty is said to be non-delegable, which
means that shipowners can be sued for breach of this duty even if they employs an
independent contractor to do the job necessary to make the vessel seaworthy and the
unseaworthy state of the vessel is a result of actionable negligence on the part of the
independent contractor . In Great American Insurance and The Sundance cases, We can
see application of this argument judging whether or not classification society is liable.
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It is true that in both cases classification society was an independent contractor of the
shipowner and was employed, in part at least, to assist the shipowner in discharging its
non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. But the doctrine of non-delegable
duties is part of the law of vicarious liability, and so it is simply irrelevant to an action
(as in The Sundancer)  for breach of contract brought by an employer  in respect of loss
suffered by the employer as a result of negligence of the contractor as opposed to an
action by the employer against the contractor for a contractual indemnity in respect of
the employer’s liability to a third party arising out of the negligence of the contractor .
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas,338 F.Supp.1012, 1972 AMC at
1472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) the court have wrestle with the issue of whether the existence
of the shipowner’s non-delegable duty to exercise due diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy precludes the imposition of liability on a classification society for its
negligence in failing to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy. This reasoning is absurd
inasmuch as it fails to recognize that allowing an injured third party to recover from both
the shipowner and the classification society when the negligent acts of both conjoin to
produce a common harm is merely an application of the common law of doctrine of joint
liability. Moreover, the fact that the shipowner has a non-delegable duty to make a
vessel seaworthy does not create any deviation from the normal rule of tort that two
parties at fault are joint tortfeasors, each of which is responsible for the loss. In short, no
conceptual basis exists for exonerating  a negligent classification society from liability
merely because the shipowner is also guilty of negligence relating to the seaworthiness
of the vessel.
Actually, a cause of action in favor of third parties against classification societies has no
adverse effect on implies warranty of  shipowner in common law. If the shipowner fails
to provide a seaworthy vessel and the classification society, as the independent
evaluator, fails to perceive that failure, both should bear the responsibility-the shipowner
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responsible for breaching its warranty of seaworthiness and societies for his negligent
representation. Furthermore, the mere fact that shipowner has a non-delegable duty does
not reduce possibility of occurrence of negligent act or default on the part of the
classification societies. So, in my personal view, main problem at present is how to meet
the balance among shipowner, classification societies and third party. This issue will be
described exhaustively in Contributory Negligence and Joint Liability and Limitation of
Liability in Chapter Six.
6.6. Contributory Negligence and Joint Liability
Some courts, such as in Great American Insurance Co.v. Bureau Veritas, The Sundancer
and Nicholas H, held that a classification society to be a joint tortfeasor would
discourage shipowners from taking proper and effective measures to furnish a seaworthy
vessel. Then this argument is as a basis for conclusion that negligent classification
should be immunized from liability. Obviously, it is not persuasive. If it were so, then, in
every case involving two parties at fault, the court should choose one or the other to be
solely liable because finding them both jointly and severally liable might encourage one
of the parties to commit torts in the future. The fact that any negligent party is held liable
for its proportionate share of fault is an adequate deterrent to that kind of careless
behavior in the future.
Furthermore, in Nocholas H [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 481, [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 492
(C.A.),  the court held the imposition of liability on the classification society would
destroy a carefully worked-out regime of rights and obligations of the shipowner and the
cargo owner inter se established by the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules. The Hague
Rules do allocate risks and liabilities between shipowners and cargo owners, and there is
good reason not to allow parties to contract governed by Hague Rules to evade their
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duties between themselves through seeking to establish and enforce provisions and
conditions not subject to such Rules. If  societies were successful in recovering
indemnification from shipowners in respect of loss suffered by cargo owners after
classification societies indemnify third party due to their negligent act, the limitation of
the liability of shipowners to cargo owners under the Hague-Visby would effectively be
deteriorated. Shipowner would need to extend  their insurance cover. These augments
sound plausible. But, actually, it is not compelling and reasonable if liability of
classification societies to third party relationship is only determined by allocation of
risks and liabilities between shipowners and cargo owners.
In my opinion, disputes about liability of  classification societies to shipowner should be
dealt with based on principle of contributory negligence. In fact, in common law
contributory negligence is always as defendant’s useful defense. The apportionment
principle of liability between classification society and shipowner can be found in the
Law Reform (contributory negligence) Act 1945, Section 1 (1) provides;
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly
of the fault of any other person or persons…the damages recoverable in respect thereof
shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the
claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage…”
In general terms, contributory negligence consists of the shipowner’s failure to take
reasonable care for his own safety or his own interests. It follows that shipowner is
guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did
not as  a reasonable man would have acted, he might be harmed, and fail to take care for
his own interests. Certainly, the concept of causation and the defense of contributory
negligence are impossible to divorce from one another, since the shipowner’s
contributory fault must be a legal and factual cause of the harm suffered. In determining
whether shipowner’s conduct is the cause of the damage suffered, it is necessary to ask
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first, whether the plaintiff has been negligent and secondly, whether that negligence
contributed to the damage.
Of course, on the side of the classification societies, due to the vast number of surveys
conducted by classification societies each year, societies cannot always conduct
thorough inspection for the vessel. Thus fault should be relevant to the thorough degree
of a standard inspection for that type of survey. A specific and sound system exists
under which standards for determining liability should be based on the type of survey
rather than the number of survey conducted.
On the other side, when dispute involves third party, in my eyes, classification societies
should be imposed liability to third party but only paying damage proportionate to his
fault based on joint liability of  shipowner and societies
The main problem is how classification society and shipowner  share the responsibility
for the damage suffered by third party.  It seems to me that it is right and reasonable that
the degree of responsibility of both parties is compared before ‘share’ of the
responsibility for the damage is solved. In order to determine what this responsibility is,
the courts should consider both the causative potency and the comparative
blameworthiness of the conduct of both parties.  The main difficulty with a comparison
of the causative potency of the shipowner and classification society appears to be that a
particular fact is either a cause of an event or it is not. It would be meaningless to inquire
which of two acts is more a cause of the harm suffered. If the harm suffered would not
have occurred but for both the classification society’s negligence and shipowner’s  fault,
then both must be causes of that harm. Accordingly, an enquiry based on solely on
causative potency should result in a 50:50 apportionment in very case. However, if
public policy, commonsense consideration and criterion of blameworthiness are also
taken into account,  the court appears able to tip the balance in favor of something other
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than a 50:50 apportionment. In addition, to determine shared liability, the courts should
also focus on the key elements of expertise, control, supervision, and ability to prevent
accidents.
But, it is worth noting that shipowner is primarily responsible and classification societies
is secondarily responsible for the third party. Shipowner has warranty of seaworthiness
under common law. As said in Non-Delegable of Chapter Six, as the independent
evaluator, the classification society is only liable for his negligent representation if he
fails to perceive the defects which should have been detected. Cause of action against
the classification societies is complementary to the shipowner’s warranty of
seaworthiness.    It means that party ( shipowner) primarily responsible for loss should
not be allowed to escape liability on the ground that a party (societies) secondarily
responsible is liable for it and only when third party cannot recover “adequate”
compensation, third party is allowed to seek another remedy against secondarily
responsible party ( societies) From the point of view in J.Stapleton (1991) 107 L.Q.R.
249,273-274, tort liability are liabilities of last resort which should be imposed only
when there is no other “adequate” remedy.
Therefore, according to above opinion, normal procedure to this type of the case should
be: first, thirty party bring action against the shipowner based on the contractual
relationship. Secondly, if action is dismissed, third party have no right to suit
classification societies. Thirdly, if compensation to third party is below actual damage,
he can take a legal proceeding against societies. Next, if classification society is proved
to be at fault, he will be liable for the damage proportionate to his fault compared to that
of shipowner and  is entitled to limit his liability (to be discussed in Limitation of
Liability of chapter Six). Finally, thirty party can recover the rest of damage from his
insurer.
57
6.7. Limitation of Liability
From the leading cases in American and English law, the fact is relatively confusing that
on one hand, the court submitted that no liability was imposed on the classification
societies even if they failed to exercise due diligence to detect and notify the defects; on
the other hand, the court held that societies were not only liable for their negligence acts
but also not entitled to limit their liability.
In Bosnor S.A. de C.V. v Tug L.A. Barrios 796 F.2d 776, 1987 AMC 2956 (5th Cir.
1986),  the surveyor argued that his liability, while not entirely exculpated, was limited
to the cost of the survey by a clause in his survey report. The survey report at issue in
Bosnor provided as follows:
“The surveyor agrees to use best efforts in behalf of those for whom this survey
is make, however this report is issued subject to the conditions that it is understood and
agreed that neither this office nor any surveyor thereof will have any liability for any
inaccuracy, errors omissions, whether due to negligence or other wise, in excess of the
actual charge made for this survey, and that use of this report shall be construed to be an
acceptance of the foregoing.” ( see id. at 781, 1987 AMC at 2962)
However, the United States Court of Appeals found that the surveyor had cited no record
source establishing that any of the parties to the suit against the surveyor had agreed to
the limited liability clause. The court noted that clause that purported to limit a party’s
legal responsibility were strictly construed and to be given effect must clearly express
the intent of  all parties whose liability would be altered by the agreement. The court
further found that, although the surveyor had prior dealings with the customer and had
included similar language in prior reports with no objection from the customer, these
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facts were insufficient to support a conclusion that the customer had agreed to the
language for purposes of the case.
In Ramsgate Walkway case, classification society, Lloyd’s Register, exposed to
unlimited liability. Lloyd’s Register pleaded guilty in the unprecedented criminal
prosecution brought against it under the Health and Safety Act following the collapse of
a passenger walkway at the UK port of Ramsgate in September 1994 in which six people
died. For the oldest, largest and most prestigious classification society to admit
responsibility in such a case is a major development. It is really landmark case. Lloyd’s
register admitted that he failed to identify that the walkway section was too stiff in
torsion,  due to unusually thick cladding (6mm) , to adapt the small rolling movement of
the pontoon, and did not inspect the support details resulting in bad quality welding.
Societies really monitor the progress and performance of the work involved in every
project. However, Patrick O’Ferrall, chairman of LR said: “while acknowledging our
failure on this occasion, we wish to place it in the context of the project as a whole and
the other parties involved.”  Actually, two Swedish companies involved in the design
and construction of walkway failed to take into account wind and tidal forces affecting
the ferry walkway. In addition, the port of Ramsgate failed to stipulate design
specifications, and a safety critical component had been poorly welded, which had
directly contributed to the accident. Furthermore, project was carried out with unseemly
haste by the port authorities who were anxious to have new facilities in place in time for
the Belgian state ferry operator BMT to start operating.
Safety can be enhanced through the application of rules and regulations of classification
societies, but a safe operation requires the full participation of all parties involved.
Societies do not design, manufacture, install, insure, possess, maintain or operate any of
the installations or ships which they class or certify.  Classification societies role is
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concerned with checking aspects of the design, manufacture and installation and
thereafter, the condition of the facility in operation on an annual basis. Societies are only
able to carry our their role as part of the overall activity in which the designer,
manufacturer, installer, owner and operator much fulfil their individual roles.
It is hard to predict what the long-term implications of the Lloyd’s Register/Ramsgate
case will but the role and functions of classification societies in the maritime community
have been distorted. Christopher Hobbs, a partner at law firm Norton Rose, commented :
“ Lloyd’s Register’s plea raises interesting questions given that all other recent cases
have exonerated class from liability to third-parities.”
However, interestingly, in high-profile cases such as The Sundancer, Nichloas H and,
Star of Alexandria, classification societies become imbued with the aura of  immunity
from legal accountability. The reasoning behind court decisions in favor of societies has
touch the line of the outrageousness. No doubt these cases have negative effects on the
maritime community. It is time to take some actions to reach harmonious state in the
respect of liabilities of classification societies.
From viewpoint of the recent development, societies have been seen as additional ‘deep-
pocket’ defendants. Actions brought directly against the classification society by the
claimants who have a contractual relationship with the shipowner or carrier seem to be
more effective approach, because the society may not have the right to limit its liability
in the same fashion as the shipowner or the carrier. Under the Hague-Visby Rules,
according to paragraph 2 of Article 4, a servant or an agent of the carrier but not
including an independent contract shall be entitled to avail himself of the defenses and
limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke.
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Certainly the societies’ exposure to third party claims will be increased as a
consequence. Meanwhile, Societies cannot rely on insurers to protect them in the event
of a nightmare disaster such as death or injuries of life and oil spill. For instance,
Lloyd’s Register is covered for the claims alleging professional negligence. But this
cover is constrained by its high cost and scarcity in the insurance market  Lloyd’s
Register comments “ in short, LR would like to be insured for every contingency, but
regrettably it is not possible” Insurers would force societies to modify their
responsibilities and .curtail their exposure to problem areas. Whole maritime
community, however, want them to broaden their responsibilities. Governments are
relying more and more on the societies.
At present, societies are expected to assume increasingly risks which are uninsurable
beyond a certain level without the benefit of a limited liability regime to fall back upon.
Ultimately, they would be force to withdraw some of their services. No one wants this to
happen.  Classification societies liability has demonstrated a paradox. Almost probably,
another situation is that the surveyor will no longer exercise his professional judgement
based on his experience, but will be required to see that the strictest test are applied.
Every inch of ship will require careful scrutiny to avoid the subsequent attribution of
blame in event of failure. We can imagine the average drydocking time will take months
rather than days and enhanced special surveys will take a large ship out of service for
possibly more than a year. Is this what we really want? Is it really necessary to go to
such extremes? Absolutely, the answer is no.
How can reach a amicable compromise? It appears to be viable and reasonable solution
that classification societies are entitled to limitation of liability not imposed unlimited
liability. Some one would hold that higher liabilities can make societies concentrate on
their service, so higher liabilities will lead to higher quality.  It is not logical argument.
Classification societies work in a market driven by confidence and trust. If the customers
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such shipowners, charterers and government don’t trust certain classification society, it
will not have any business required by those customers. Obviously, drive for quality is
inherent in what class supplies. Exposure to higher liabilities only invoke reduction of
professional services, not higher qualities. Shipowner can have a right to limit his
liability under some international convention whatever it is Hague rule, Hague-Visby
Rule or Limitation of Liability Convention 1976. Why isn’t classification society
entitled to this right? It seems to be both unfair and unreasonable. The reasons why
classification societies need to limit their liability are as follows:
First, due to a large quantity of parties who classification societies have direct or indirect
relationships with, such as shipowners, government authorities, cargo owners,
charterers, underwriters, potential liabilities are rather huge.  Liability is in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
Secondly,  classification societies has to be at the cutting edge of technology to bolster
and facilitate the safety in shipping industry. In some circumstances, societies cannot
rely on past experience and must make decisions at the complex and unprecedented
level. There are shortage of information and materials on the base of which to make
decisions, yet everyone wants societies to make a definite statement of approval. The
level of risks to  potential liabilities  must be very high.
Thirdly, societies perform their responsibilities on the basis of high value assets which
are exposed to even higher liabilities. But the fees charged by societies are relevant to
nature of type of services provided and have no links with size of asset value. A
surveyor might take the same time and make the same charges during checking a given
piece of construction or equipment whether the ship is  relatively small bulk vessel or
ultra large crude oil vessel.
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From the above augment, it is understandable and reasonable that classification societies
are entitled to same or similar right as the shipowners to limit  their indeterminate
liabilities.
Then, a question arises as to whether classification societies would have the right to
global limitation as shipowners enjoy. The International Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims of 1976 does not delineate whether societies are entitled to
global limitation. With the reference to Article 1, shipowners and salvors are specifically
mentioned to be entitled to limitation of liability. The term “shipowner” includes the
“owner, charter, manager and operator of a seagoing ship”. Then, subject to Article 2, if
a person brings an claim against “ any person for whose act, neglect or default the
shipowner or salvor is responsible”, such person shall be entitled to avail himself of the
limitation of liability provided for in the Convention. Therefore, one can presume that a
classification society would have such right because society could avail its of the
limitation of liability for an error or negligence provided for in the 1976 London
Convention, proved that the claim made against it is one of those referred to in Article 2.
But, it is just reasoning and predicting. For instance, in Aegean Sea [1998] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 39, vessel was carrying a cargo of crude oil to a refinery in Spain. She grounded on
her way to the berth, broke up and exploded. Most the cargo was spilled and claims were
brought against the owners for 165 million dollars. The owners in turn sought an
indemnity from the charterers under the charterparty for 65 million dollars on the basis
that the charterers were in breach of their safe port warranty in the charterparty. The
charterers argued that they were entitled to limit their liability to 12 million dollars under
the 1976 London Convention. Actual definition of Shipowners includes the owner,
charterer, manager and operator of a seagoing shipping. However, English High Court
held that the charterers were not entitled to limit their liability in a claim by owners
against them in their capacity as charterers. However, at the meantime, High court held
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that charterers were entitled to the same benefit of limiting liability as the owners when
they were effectively acting as owners.  The judge found that the limitation regime was
concerned with claims by third parties against all those entitled to limit. By the same
reasoning, classification societies would be entitled to limit their liability as independent
contractors in the course of  employment under the 1976 Convention in respect of a
claim for indemnity pursued by third parties but not owners. Obviously, if societies have
not right to limit their liability against shipowners, the principle of limitation of liability
will be crippled. To be frank, it appears to be still not so clear whether classification
societies have a right of limitation of liability under London Convention. The exclusive
international  convention dealing with the liability of classification societies could be a
most desirable choice.
On the other hand, even if surely societies have a limit of liability under London
Convention, tonnage regime is not acceptable as it does not reflect nature of the work of
the classification societies and ship size has no relevance to the value of the service.
Difference between societies’ responsibility and those of owners are substantial.
Shipowner are controlling everything from trading to maintenance, manning of the
vessel. Societies control none of them and simply check and survey vessels at
determined intervals. It is quite unjust to expose two parties, at the different level of
responsibilities and positions, to the same level of liability.
In my opinion, the most possible solution is a fee-based system to calculate a limitation
of liability. Value of service rendered by classification societies is measured by the
amount of the fee which is payable by the shipowner. Liability will be limited to the
amount in the light of  service fee multiplied by certain figure. Actually, since question
as to whether classification societies are within ambit of the International Convention of
Limitation of liability for Maritime Claims  could not be foreseeable quickly enough to
resolve present concerns, Comite Maritime International (CMI) has produced a set of
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model contractual clauses (see Annex B) which regulate and limit the liability of the
societies. However, the CMI initiative focuses solely on the contractual relationship and
does not embrace the issue of third party claims. Alternatively, according to model
contractual clauses, limitation multiple will be set by the classification society itself in
its own rules and regulations based on  market conditions and applicable law. ( see
Annex B, clause 10) It may rise more uncertainties and disputes.
Clearly, CMI model contractual clauses cannot resolve fully and completely the liability
of classification society. In truth, at present there does not exist internationally
recognized yardstick for measuring classification society performance. It appears to be
an inevitable trend and consequence that international convention on liability of
classification society is urged to emerge as soon as possible.
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Chapter Seven
Summary and Conclusion
Classification Societies play a unique and increasingly vital role in the promotion of
maritime of safety and environmental protection. The societies carry out as agents of
governments the statutory survey and certification which is established and mandated by
law, while they also perform their traditional private classification function applying
rules established by the societies themselves. As expressed in the judgment of the House
of Lords in the case of The Nicholas H, [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 497, the present role of
the societies is to promote safety of life and ships at sea in the public interest. The
problem would arise as to whether classification societies are entitled to statutory
immunity because the fact is that boundary between private and public functions is often
overlapped.
The legal framework and concepts already are in place in this dissertation for the
recognition of cause of action against classification societies either in contract or in tort.
Regardless of whether the classification societies’ duties derive from custom, society
rules, common law, statute, contract, their major duties are to take due care to inspect
and  defect the defects in vessels and then notify the owner or charterer thereof. In
theory, in terms of concurrent liability, basis of liability of classification society with
shipowner or other parties with contractual relationship, whether based in contract or
in tort, should be same. It means that any tortious duty of care, if it exits, will have been
defined by the scope of those contractual right and liabilities which  the relevant parties
have agreed. If third party lodges the claim in tort, important factors to consider should
include foreseeability, reliance and proximate cause.
66
Liability of classification societies is really a burgeoning issue. On one hand, from the
viewpoint of some leading cases in common law system, it is misguided that
classification societies should not assume the liability even if they fail to perform their
duty merely because shipowners have non-delegable duty to make ship seaworthy or
cannot bear this financial burden. We must admit that whole maritime group rely on the
classification society as an independent verifier of the vessel’s seaworthy condition.
Whether based on principle of negligent misrepresentation in American law or
negligent misstatement in English law, liability should be imposed upon the
classification society. Indeed, the undeniable reality of human existence is that
accountability is an effective means of securing high quality.
But, on the other hand, a serious problem was felt to be the increasing frequency of
claims against the classification societies as additional ‘deep pocket’ defendants. The
main reason is that societies may not have the right to limit their liability in the same
fashion as the shipowners or carriers. If this increase in the claims exposure of the
societies were to continue unchecked, the societies could, in extremis, be forced to
withdraw some of the service which whey perform in the public interest. The result will
deteriorate whole benefit of whole maritime community, specially in the respect of
maritime safety and environment. Furthermore, the imposition of strict liability or
unlimited liability against the societies could lead to collapse of the classification
system, then maritime commerce system. of performance.
Legal development in the area of global limitation of liability would perhaps lead to the
same protection for classification societies as for shipowner. Additionally, the Himalaya
clause could be extended to cover classification societies against third party, and specific
exclusion clauses between the society and shipowner would be also enforceable.  But all
these are uncertain and often invoke controversy. Also, some defenses, discussed in this
paper, asserted by classification societies, are just reasoning and predicting.
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The most desirable solution, in my opinion, would be about shared liability and
limitation of liability at the international mutually agreed level. Furthermore, the most
reasonable and viable solution about limitation liability is not based on tonnage regime
as provided for in the 1976 London Limitation Convention, but a fee-based system to
calculate a limitation of liability. At the same time, it is worth noting that shipowner is
primarily responsible for loss and  cause of action against the classification societies is
complementary to the shipowner’s implied warranty of seaworthiness in common law.
Therefore, only when third party cannot recover “adequate” compensation from the
shipowner, liability in tort will be imposed upon classification society.
All in all, it would be wise and reasonable judicial policy to create a controllable and
harmonious situation when liability is established. Corollary of the feasible principles of
liability of classification societies should be a compromise and balance among all
interests in maritime community. The proper and balanced use of the concepts put
forward in this dissertation would match interests of all and prevent a chaotic and
uncontrollable situation.
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ANNEX A
RESOLUTION A.739 (18) adopted on 4 November 1993
GUIDELINES FOR THE AUTHORIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONS ACTING
ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION
THE ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING Article 15(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime
Organisation concerning the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and
guidelines concerning maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine
pollution from ships,
RECOGNIZING the importance of ships being in compliance with the provisions of
relevant international conventions, such as SOLAS 74, Load Lines 66, MARPOL 73/78
and STCW 78, to ensure prevention of maritime casualties and marine pollution from
ships,
NOTING that the Administrations are responsible for taking necessary measures to
ensure that ships flying their States' flags comply with the provisions of such
conventions, including surveys and certification,
NOTING FURTHER that, under regulation I/6 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention and
regulation 4 of Annex I and regulation 10 of Annex II of MARPOL 73/78, the
Administration may entrust the inspections and surveys to nominated surveyors or
recognised organisations and further that the Administration shall notify the
Organisation of the specific responsibilities and conditions of the authority delegated to
nominated surveyors or recognised organisations,
DESIRING to develop uniform procedures and a mechanism for the delegation of
authority to, and the minimum standards for, recognised organisations acting on behalf
of the Administration, which would assist flag States in the uniform and effective
implementation of the relevant IMO conventions,
HAVING CONSIDERED the recommendations made by the Maritime Safety
Committee at its sixty-second session and by the Marine Environment Protection
Committee at its thirty-fourth session,
1. ADOPTS the Guidelines for the Authorisation of Organisations Acting on behalf of
the Administration, set out in the Annex to the present resolution;
72
2. URGES Governments as soon as possible to: (a)  apply the said Guidelines; and (b)
review the standards of already recognised organisations in the light of the Minimum
Standards for recognised organisations acting on behalf of the Administration set out in
Appendix I to the Annex to the present resolution;
3. REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection
Committee:
(a)  to review the Guidelines and Minimum Standards with a view to improving them as
necessary; and
(b)  to develop, as a matter of urgency, detailed specifications on the precise survey and
certification functions of recognised organisations;
4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to collect from Member Governments information
on the implementation of the present resolution.
GUIDELINES FOR THE AUTHORIZATION OF ORGANIZATIONS ACTING
ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION
General
1. Under the provisions of regulation I/6 of SOLAS 74Y article 13 of Load Lines 66,
regulation 4 of Annex I and regulation 10 of Annex 11 of MARPOL 73/78 and article 6
of Tonnage 69, many flag States authorise organisations to act on their behalf in the
surveys and certification and determination of tonnage as required by these conventions.
2. Control in the assignment of such authority is needed in order to promote uniformity
of inspections and maintain established standards. Therefore, any assignment of
authority to recognised organisations should:
2.1  determine that the organisation has adequate resources in terms of  technical,
managerial and research capabilities to accomplish the tasks being assigned, in
accordance with the Minimum Standards for the Recognised Organisations Acting on
behalf of the Administration set out in appendix 1;
2.2  have a formal written agreement between the Administration and the organisation
being authorised which should as a minimum include the elements as set out in appendix
2 or equivalent legal arrangements;
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2.3  specify instructions detailing actions to be followed in the event that a ship is found
not fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board, or presenting
unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment;
2.4  provide the organisation with all appropriate instruments of national law giving
effect to the provisions of the conventions or specify whether the Administration's
standards go beyond convention requirements in any respect; and
2.5 specify that the organisation maintains records which can provide the Administration
with data to assist in interpretation of convention regulations.
Verification and monitoring
3 The Administration should establish a system to ensure the adequacy of work
performed by the organisations authorised to act on its behalf. Such a system should,
inter alia, include the following items:
3.1  Procedures for communication with the organisation
3.2  Procedures for reporting from the organisation and processing of reports by the
Administration
3.3  Additional ship's inspections by the Administration
3.4 TheAdministration's evaluation/acC8ptance of the certification of the organisation’s
quality system by an independent body of auditors recognised by the Administration
3.5  Monitoring and verification of class related matters, as applicable.
Appendix 1
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR RECOGNIZED ORGANIZATIONS ACTING
ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION
An organisation may be recognised by the Administration to perform statutory work on
its behalf subject to compliance with the following minimum conditions for which the
organisation should submit complete information and substantiation.
General
1. The relative size, structure, experience and capability of the organisation
commensurate with the type and degree of authority intended to be delegated thereto
should-be demonstrated.
2. The organisation should be able to document extensive experience in assessing the
design, construction and equipment of merchant ships and, as applicable, their safety
management system.
Specific provisions
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3. For the purpose of delegating authority to perform certification service of a statutory
nature in accordance with regulatory instruments which require the ability to review
applicable engineering designs, drawings, calculations and similar technical information
to technical regulatory criteria as dictate by the Administration and to conduct field
survey and inspection to ascertain the degree of compliance of structural and mechanical
systems and components with such  technical criteria, the following should apply:
3.1The organisation should provide for the publication and systematic maintenance of
rules and/or regulations in the English language for the design, construction and
certification of ships and their associated essential engineering systems as well as the
provision o an adequate research capability to ensure appropriate updating of the
published criteria.
3.2The organisation should allow participation in the development of its rules and/or
regulations by representatives of the Administration and other parties concerned.
3.3The organisation should be established with:
3.3.1a significant technical, managerial and support staff catering also for capability of
developing and maintaining rules and/or regulations; and
3.3.2a qualified professional staff to provide the required service representing an
adequate geographical coverage and local representation as required.
3.4The organisation should be governed by the principles of ethical behaviour, which
should be contained in a Code of Ethics and as such: recognise the inherent
responsibility associated with a delegation of authority to include assurance as to the
adequate performance of services as well as the confidentiality of related information as
appropriate.
3.5The organisation should demonstrate the technical, administrative and managerial
competence and capacity to ensure the provision of quality services in a timely fashion.
3.6The organisation should be prepared to provide relevant information to the
Administration.
3.7The organisation’s management should define and document its policy and objectives
for, and commitment to, quality and ensure that this policy is understood,- implemented
and maintained at all levels in the organisation.
3.8The organisation should develop, implement and maintain an effective internal
quality system based on appropriate parts of internationally recognised quality standards
no less effective than ISO 9000 series, and which, inter alia , ensures that:
3.8.1the organisation’s rules and/or regulations are established and maintained in a
systematic manner;
3.8.2the organisation’s rules and/or regulations are complied with;
3.8.3the requirements of the statutory work for which the organisation is authorised, are
satisfied;
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3.8.4the responsibilities, authorities and interrelation of personnel whose work affects
the quality of the organisation’s services, are defined and documented;
3.8.5all work is carried out under controlled conditions;
3.8.6a supervisory system is in place which monitors the actions and work carried out by
the organisation;
3.8.7a system for qualification of surveyors and continuous updating of their knowledge
is implemented;
3.8.8records are maintained, demonstrating achievement of the required standards in the
items covered by the services performed, as well as the effective operation of the quality
system; and
3.8.9a comprehensive system of planned and documented internal audits of the quality
related activities in all locations is implemented.
3.9The organisation should be subject to certification of its quality system by an
independent body of auditors recognised by the Administration.
4. For the purpose of delegating authority to perform certification services of a statutory
nature in accordance with regulatory instruments which require the ability to assess by
audit and similar inspection of the relevant safety management system attributes of shore
based ship management entities and shipboard personnel and systems, the following
should, in addition, apply:
4.1the provision and application of proper procedures to assess the degree of compliance
of the applicable shore-side and shipboard safety management systems;
4.2the provision of a systematic training and qualification regime for its professional
personnel engaged in the safety management system certification process to ensure
proficiency in the applicable quality and safety management criteria as well as adequate
knowledge of the technical and operational aspects of maritime safety management; and
4.3the means of assessing through the use of qualified professional staff the application
and maintenance of the safety management system both shore based as well as on board
ships intended to be covered in the certification.
Appendix 2
ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN AN AGREEMENT
A formal written agreement or equivalent between the Administration and the
recognised organisation should as a minimum cover the following items:
1. Application
2. Purpose
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3.    General conditions
4.    The execution of functions under authorisation
4.1   Functions in accordance with the general authorisation
4.2   Functions in accordance with special (additional) authorisation
4.3   Relationship between the organisation’s statutory and other related activities
4.4   Functions to co-operate with port States to facilitate the rectification of reported
port State control deficiencies or the discrepancies within the organisation’s purview.
5    Legal basis of the functions under authorisation
5.1   Acts, regulations and supplementary provisions
5.2   Interpretations
5.3   Deviations and equivalent solutions
6    Reporting to the Administration
6.1  Procedures for reporting in the case of general authorisation
6.2 Procedures for reporting in the case of special authorisation
6.3 Reporting on classification of ships (assignment of class, alterations and
cancellations), as applicable
6.4   Reporting of cases where a ship did not in all respects remain fit to proceed to sea
without danger to the ship or persons on board or presenting unreasonable threat of harm
to the environment
6.5   Other reporting
7    Development of rules and/or regulations - Information
7.1   Co-operation in connection with development of rules and/or regulations - liaison
meetings
7.2   Exchange of rules and/or regulations and information
7.3   Language and form
8     Other conditions 8.1   Remuneration 8.2   Rules for administrative proceedings
8.3   Confidentiality
8.4   Liability 8.5   Financial responsibility
8.6   Entry into force
8.7   Termination
8.8   Breach of agreement
8.9   Settlement of disputes
8.10  Use of sub-contractors
8.11  Issue of the agreement
8.12  Amendments
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9     Specification of the authorisation from the Administration to the organisation
9.1   Ship types and sizes
9.2   Conventions and other instruments, including relevant national legislation
9.3   Approval of drawings
9.4   Approval of material and equipment
9.5   Surveys
9.6   Issuance of certificates
9.7   Corrective actions
9.8   Withdrawal of certificates
9.9   Reporting
10    The Administration's supervision of duties delegated to the
organisation
10.1   Documentation of quality assurance system
10.2   Access to internal instructions, circulars and guidelines
10.3   Access by the Administration to the organisation’s documentation relevant to the
Administration's fleet
10.4   Co-operation with the Administration's inspection and verification work
10.5   Provision of information and statistics on, e.g. damage and casualties relevant to
the Administration's fleet.
Appendix 3
Some other IMO resolutions and circulars concerning the Authorisation of
recognised organisations acting on behalf of maritime administration as follows:
IMO Resolution A.789(19) “Specifications on the survey and certification functions of
recognised organisations acting on behalf of the Administration”.
IMO Resolution A.847(20) “Guidelines to assist flag states in the implementation of
IMO instruments”.
IMO MSC/Circ.710/IMO MEPC/Circ.307 “Model agreement for the authorisation of
recognised organisations acting on behalf of the Administration”.
IMO MSC/Circ.788/IMO MEPC/Circ.325 “Authorisation of recognised organisations
acting on behalf of Administration”.
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ANNEX B
CMI Model Contractual Clauses
The following model contractual clauses have been drafted on the initiative of the
Comite Maritime International (CMI) by a Joint Working Group of representatives of
concerned Non-governmental International Organizations, as described in the Group’s
Report. These clauses are intended to reflect the increasingly important role which
Classification societies play in maritime affairs with regard to safety, not only in the
performance of quasi-governmental functions with regard to statutory survey and
certification but also in the performance of their traditional classification work for the
maritime industry.
In this regard, attention is called to IMOP Assembly Resolution A.789 (19) and MSC
Circ. 710/MEPC Circ. 307 on Guidelines for the Authorization of Organizations Acting
on Behalf of the Administration. (see Note 1 below) and to EU Council Directive
95/57/EC of 22 November 1994 on Common Rules and Standards for Ship Inspection
and Survey Organizations, etc.
The model clauses define and clarify, subject to applicable national law, the
circumstances under which the civil liability of the Societies and their employees and
agents should be regulated or limited.
The rationale for such regulation and limitation is set forth in the Group’s Report.
These model clauses are intended to be read in conjunction with both and Report and the
Principle of Conduct for Classification Societies produced by the same Joint Working
Group and dated 16 January 1996.
Model Clauses
Part I; For inclusion in agreements between the Societies and governments
1. (a) The duties and functions of [Classification Society] pursuant to this agreement
are as specified in Annex I attached. (see Note 2 below)
(b) [Government] shall be given the opportunity to verify that the quality system and
performance of [Classification Society] continues to comply with the requirements
specified in Annex I attached. In this regard [Government] may utilize appropriate audit
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methods, including recognition of audits performed on [Classification Society] by an
independent body of auditors effectively representing the interests of  [Government],
such as the IACS QSCS auditors. The Principles of Conduct for Classification Societies
referred to in the introduction above shall be the standard (see Note 3 below) for
measurement of performance by [Classification Society].
(c) [Classification Society] shall report to [Government], in accordance with the
procedures agreed between them, the information specified in Annex II (see Note 4
below) concerning surveys and certification performed by [Classification Society] on
behalf of  [Government], and shall promptly notify [Government] of any change in the
status of the classification of a ship which is classed by [Classification Society] and is
flying the flag of [State].
2.  In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified in Annex I, whether pursuant
to applicable international agreements, conventions, national legislation, or this
agreement, [Classification Society] acts solely as the agent of [Government], under
whose authority or upon whose behalf it performs such work.
3. In any claim arising out of the performance of a duty or responsibility, or out of any
certification with regard to work covered by Annex I, [Classification Society] and its
employees and agents shall be subject to the same liabilities and be entitled to the same
defenses (including but not limited to any immunity form or limitation of liability) as
would be available to [Government’s] own personnel if they had themselves performed
the work and/or certification in question. (see Note 5 below)
Part II: For inclusion in the Rules of the Societies (which contain the terms of
agreements between the Societies an d Shipowners)
4. Responsibilities of [Classification Society]
(a) [Classification Society] when acting pursuant to these Rules certifies the
classification of a ship (see Note 6 below) to the shipowner, (see Note 7 below) and
does not certify the condition of the ship for any purpose other than the assignment of
classification under these Rules.
(b) in carrying out its obligation pursuant to these Rules. [Classification Society] agrees
that the Principles of Conduct for Classification Societies referred to in the Introduction
above shall be the standard for performance of its services.
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5. Responsibilities of the shipowner
(a) It is the responsibility of the shipowner:
(i) to maintain a classed ship, its machinery and equipment in compliance with the Rules
and requirements of [Classification Society]; and
(ii) to operate the ship in accordance with all applicable Rules and conditions of class.
(a) It is the responsibility of the shipowner to ensure:
(i) that plans an d particulars of any proposed alterations to the hull, equipment or
machinery which could invalidate or affect the classification of the ship are submitted to
[Classification Society] for prior approval; and
(ii) that all repairs or modifications ot hull, equipment or machinery which are required
in order that a ship may retain her class are carried out by the shipowner in accordance
with the Rules and requirements of [Classification Society].
(c) It is the responsibility of the shipowner:
(i) to make a classed ship available for survey in such a manner, location and condition
as to ensure that all surveys necessary for the maintenance of class can be carried out by
[Classification Society] at the proper time and in accordance with the Rules and
requirements of [Classification Society]; and
(ii) to ensure that there is compliance with the requirements of [Classification Society]
resulting form such surveys.
(d) It is the responsibility of the shipowner to inform [Classification Society] without
delay:
(i) of any change of the ship’s flag, ownership, management or name;
(ii) of any collision or grounding of ship;
(iii) of any other damage, defect, breakdown, incident of navigation or proposed repair
which might invalidate or affect the ship’s classification; and
(iv) of any change in the intended or actual use of the ship which  might invalidate or
affect the ship’s classification; and
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6. A failure by the shipowner to fulfill the foregoing responsibilities may in the
reasonable exercise of discretion by [Classification Society] result in, among other
measures, suspension or cancellation of classification or the withholding of certificates
or reports by [Classification Society]. (see Note 8 below)
7. [Classification Society] shall not be liable for any claim arising out of the
performance of services pursuant ot these Rules where such claim arises out of an act or
omission:
(a) attributed to [ Society] or its employees, agents or other persons acting on behalf of
[Society], unless such act or omission violates the standard of reasonable care (see Note
9 below) or
(b) by any employee of [Society] acting outside the terms or scope of his employment;
or
(c) by any agent or other person acting on behalf of [Society], when such act or omission
exceeds the authority granted in writing by [Society] to such agent or such other person.
8. Without prejudice to clause 7 above, in any claim arising out of the performance of
services pursuant to these Rules, [Classification Society] shall be liable only for losses
resulting directly from its act or omission. In no event shall [Classification Society] be
liable for any indirect or consequential losses.
9. (a) Without prejudice to clause 7 above, any liability of [Classification Society] for a
claim arising out of the performance of a service pursuant to these Rules shall be limited
to the amount of the fee specified or calculated by [Society] in respect of the service in
question, multiplies by “X”. (see Note 10 below)
(b) If any claims are made against an employee or agent or other person in respect of
whose act or omission [Classification Society] is found liable, such person shall be
entitled to avail himself of the limitation of liability provided in sub paragraph (a) of this
paragraph, unless it is proved that the damage giving rise to the claim(s) resulted form
an act or omission done by such person with the intent to cause such damage, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result. (see Note 11
blow)
(c) For an additional fee or such other consideration as may be agreed between the
shipowner and [Classification Society], the shipowner may secure a higher multiple than
that set forth in sub-paragraph (a) above.
82
(d) the limit of liability of [Classification Society] set forth in sub-paragraphs (a)  and (c)
above shall not apply where it is proved that the damage giving rise to the claim(s)
resulted form an actor omission of [Society] with the intent to cause such damage, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.
10. Any dispute arising out of or in connection with these Rules and any issues
concerning responsibility, liability or limitation or liability shall be determined in
accordance with the law of [state]. (see Note 12 below)
11. Any suit or proceeding in respect of claim arising out of or in connection with these
Rules or the performance by [Classification Society], its employees or agents of a
function pursuant to these rules shall be instituted in or transferred to the appropriate
court of [State and venue], (see Note 12 below) which shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to  hear and determine any such dispute. (see Note 13 below)
Notes:
1. As expanded in the Reports and Annexes of the Flag States Implementation Sub-
Committee (FSI) of the IMO’s MSC and MEPC, currently FSI 3/17 (23 March 95),
paragraphs 8.35-8.38 and Annex 6, paragraphs 6.5-6.6.
2. A model for Annex I is not offered. It is intended Annex I should contain the technical
and operational requirements to agreed between the Government and the Classification
Society.
3. Without prejudice to the application of other internationally agreed standards which
are at a minimum substantially equivalent to those contained the Principles of Conduct.
4. It is intended that Annex II should contain the detailed reporting requirements to be
agreed between the Government and Classification Society.
5. Reference to applicable provisions of national law should be added following the text
of the clause.
6. “Ship” for the purposes of these Principles of Conduct shall include any type of vessel
which is classed with or otherwise surveyed or certificated by the Classification Society.
7. “Shipowner” for the purposes of these Principles of Conduct shall mean the individual
or juridical person in a contractual relationship with the Classification Society.
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8. It is recognized that it is also a common practice of Classification Society to provide
in their Rules that failure of the shipowner to make timely payment of fees charged for
services rendered may, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by Society concerned,
result in suspension of cancellation of classification or the withholding of certificates or
reports.
9. Different standards or terms may be substituted in accordance with applicable national
law.
10. The actual number to be substituted for “X” will be et by the Classification Society
in consideration of market forces and applicable law.
11. This provision is based upon Article 1(4) of the London Limitation Convention
1976.
12. This will normally be the State of domicile or situs of the Society.
13. In order to survive the common law test of forum non conveniens, the venue must be
a reasonable one in terms of its legal system, the demonstrated competence of its courts
in such cases, and its convenience to the claimant and witnesses.
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ANNEX C
Types of Class Surveys
Type of Survey Principal Content Period/Year(s)
Special Survey
A thorough and complete survey of all the
items: thickness measurements of the hull,
pressure testing of the tanks, opening up and
testing the running of the machinery; for
tankers, especially tankers of more than ten
years, it is more stringent and extensive
5
Annual Survey
A general examination of hull and appliance
machinery, electrical plants, steering gear and
fittings. It is mandatory for passenger ships.
1
Docking Survey
Required for the following items: the hull part
below the deepest load waterline, rudders,
thrusters, sea valves and overboard discharges 2.5
Boiler Survey
A survey containing external and internal
visual survey of water/steam, drums and shell,
casing and insulation, combustion chambers,
oil burning units, etc.
2
Shaft Survey A survey focusing on the shaft and bearings At intervals
